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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Over the past two decades, the International Development Research Centre 
(IDRC) has been engaged in the establishment and subsequent devolution or 
closure of between 15 to 20 international secretariats and quasi-secretariats. As 
IDRC is currently pursuing the devolution of two program initiatives, Senior 
Management requested that past experience with devolution be examined to see 
if there what lessons could be gleaned. Hence, the primary objective of this 
evaluation is to develop guiding principles that could inform future devolution 
practice.  
Based on the rationale for devolution, geographical location, perceived degree 
of success, donor makeup, and post devolution longevity, a sample of seven 
secretariats was selected for study: Micronutrient Initiative (MI), Bellanet Inter-
national Secretariat, the International Model Forest Network (IMFN), the Trade 
and Industrial Policy Secretariat (TIPS), the Secretariat for Industrial Support 
for Economic Research in Africa (SISERA), International Network for Bamboo 
and Rattan (INBAR) and the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC).  
Devolution of international secretariats: Beginning in 1992, international 
secretariats were created by IDRC as a modality for incubating innovative re-
search ideas funded by multiple donors. Although the secretariats were 
“housed” in IDRC they were expected to operate semi-autonomously with their 
operations subject to IDRC’s administrative policies and practice and their re-
search program closely linked to IDRC’s existing program initiatives. Adminis-
trative costs would be reimbursed as part of IDRC’s contributions as a donor. 
Although, each secretariat was managed by a Steering Committee or Advisory 
Board, including representatives of external donors and experts, as legal entities, 
secretariats were accountable to IDRC. Devolution requires the creation of sep-
arate legal entities. Of 15 secretariats established since 1992, three were spun off 
as separate legal entities (MI, ATPS, TIPS); one became an international agency 
(INBAR); one a Canadian corporation (WETV); one absorbed into a depart-
ment of the Canadian government (IMFN); one became part of a network 
(ADRF); three were incorporated into IDRC programming (involution) (EEP-
SEA, RITC and EMS); and the remaining five closed.  
Good practice from the field: IDRC is a centre of research that tests ideas, not 
an implementer of development programs. When a concept is proven it gener-
ally moves into an implementation phase and the research focus diminishes as 
was the case for MI, INBAR and IMFN. At this point the initiative no longer 
fits with IDRC’s specifically legislated mandate. It is in this way that, in the 
world of international development, IDRC is unique. Therefore it is not surpris-
ing that the review of literature revealed that very few donors practice ‘devolu-
tion’ like IDRC. The closest approximation was a discussion of donor exit by 
Levinger and Mcleod (2002) in which ‘phase over’ refers to a sponsor’s transfer 
of program activities to a local institution or community. Other approximations 
that had affinity were: the work of Rogers and Macias (2004); Gardner, Green-
blott and Joubert, (2005); performance reviews of ‘exit’ completed by SIDA, 
Danida, Norad (2008); DFID (2007); and the World Bank (2007).  
These examinations of donor experience with exit or transition suggest guiding 
principles, the most significant of which is that exit or transition should be con-
sidered and planned at the design phase of the initiative. Early planning facili-
tates a focus on results including an articulation of the expected outcomes of 
the initiative based on a defined timeline and resources allocated. This also en-
“Almost anything is easier to get 
into than out of” 
Agnes Allen 
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sures transparency as all stakeholders have a clear understanding of the mile-
stones to be achieved and expected commitments to the project by donors, 
partners and staff over a specific period of time. These sources also conclude 
that an exit plan must be flexible enough to ensure that affected parties have 
enough time to prepare themselves for the end or transition of a program but 
not so much time as to create dependency. The plan should involve key partners 
in the design and in ongoing monitoring of the intervention. Clear and timely 
decision making on ‘exit’ and ongoing dialogue ensures that the decision to exit 
or transition does not come as a surprise. 
Key findings about IDRC devolution policy and practice: During its two 
decades of devolution experience, IDRC has not developed formal policies or 
guidelines related to the formulation of devolution strategies, the management 
of devolution processes or the sustainability of devolved programs or secretari-
ats. IDRC explicitly refers to devolution in the 2000-2005 CSPF as “…the centre 
will devolve the responsibility for coordination, administration and management of programs 
and networks to institutions in the South”. The 2005 to 2010 CSPF also states that 
“…devolution involves the passing of substantive and managerial control of an activity housed 
within the Centre to an external agency”. Key informants generally understood this 
concept of devolution and acknowledged that devolution was related to South-
ern empowerment and therefore a core value of IDRC. However several re-
spondents did not necessarily view ‘devolution’ as a core principle or practice of 
IDRC but as a ‘tactic’ implemented to spin off or transition a secretariat or simi-
lar program initiative. There was no consistent understanding that secretariats 
had a finite life cycle and therefore would eventually be ‘devolved’. The rationale 
for devolution of specific secretariats was often unclear and respondents agreed 
that those decisions were brokered at a very high level. However, the decisions 
to devolve were based on specific circumstances, changing program priorities 
and/or emerging opportunities, rather than IDRC’s principle of devolution. As 
such, planning for devolution only arose when the decision to devolve a secre-
tariat was made rather than as an integral part of the secretariat’s life cycle. The 
importance of factors external to a secretariat affecting the approach, timing, 
level of effort, the success of the devolution process and the devolution itself 
cannot be overstated. These include: availability of an interested capable recipi-
ent; the collective will of external donors; and the availability and predictability 
of funding.  
Key findings about effectiveness of the devolution process: Because of 
these many variables, it is not surprising that IDRC has a mixed record regard-
ing, ‘how well the Centre does devolution’. Devolutions that have been regarded 
as ‘successes’ in terms of timeliness of the process, due attention to key compo-
nents, management of donor relations and ongoing communication with key 
stakeholders include AERC and TIPS. MI and IMFN were also identified as 
examples of efficient devolution. Consensus suggests, that the most significant 
factors contributing to the efficacy of the process relate to a) the experience, 
skill and leadership capacity of executive directors; b) communication and/or 
inclusion of staff, donors and partners; c) the clarity and speed of decision mak-
ing with respect to strategic direction and implementation; and d) the direct in-
volvement of senior leaders. In the cases where the process was less effective, 
such as Bellanet and SISERA, indecisive leadership and poor communication 
were cited as the primary contributing factors. Adequate attention to change 
management and sensitivity to ‘people’ issues was also identified as a critical 
element of devolution ‘done right’. The TIPS and Bellanet experiences exempli-
fied the importance of paying attention to people in the process.  
Evaluation of IDRC’s Experience with the Devolution of International Secretariats 
vii   
Key findings about post devolution sustainability and learning: In retro-
spect, stakeholders agreed that the decision to devolve was necessary and in 
some cases inevitable as secretariats had ‘outgrown’ or moved away from the 
Centre’s research mandate. It was certainly anticipated that devolution of these 
secretariats would benefit both the secretariats and IDRC. In the case of the 
former, management autonomy, and access to funding from other donors were 
anticipated benefits, while for IDRC reduced administrative and financial bur-
dens and a more steadfast focus on their mandate were envisaged. As such, de-
volved entities such as MI, IMFN, INBAR, AERC and TIPS have benefited 
from increased donor funding, improved relations with a range of partner insti-
tutes and/or countries and a positive global brand.  However, the post devolu-
tion period has also been challenging for several entities. TIPS and INBAR both 
experienced difficulties attracting ‘core funding’, as donors generally prefer to 
fund specific program initiatives. The provision of core or legacy funding by 
IDRC to the devolved entities is therefore highly appreciated. However the 
Centre would do well to articulate guidelines that would inform either the provi-
sion or termination of core funding. Another challenge identified has been the 
tradition of selecting program officers (PO) to head devolved secretariats, par-
ticularly where POs do not have the necessary leadership and management skills 
to operate without a high level of institutional support. The need for a careful 
identification of core competencies and an open and competitive selection 
process for executive directors is a way to mitigate this shortcoming. 
Guiding principles: In conclusion, more often than not, the devolution proc-
ess has resulted in the intended outcome of a legally separate entity with the 
capacity to build on the innovative idea incubated within IDRC. The seven 
cases reviewed suggest fundamental guiding principles for effective devolution: 
1. Plan Early. Early planning is a cornerstone of successful devolution re-
quiring development of a good, well thought out strategy that is solidly 
linked with IDRC’s mandate, values and strategic direction;  
2. Build Capacity. In most cases, successful devolution and Southern em-
powerment requires considerable capacity building that needs to start 
long before the devolution occurs;  
3. Collaborate and Partner. Open and transparent communication with 
staff, donors, and partners has, in each examined case, been a factor in 
the successful devolutions;  
4. Develop a Transition Strategy. Once a strategic direction is set and a 
notion of timing is in place, a transition strategy or change management 
plan to deal with the human aspects of change becomes essential;  
5. Assure Continuity. A plan for continued involvement and availability of 
required intellectual capital is essential as was demonstrated by all of 
IDRC's successful devolutions;  
6. Build Good Governance and Management Frameworks. Taking the 
time early on in the devolution process to ensure that governance issues 
are addressed and that management processes (such as recruitment, fi-
nancial management, program management, accountability, monitoring 
and evaluation) are developed and implemented: and  
7. Demonstrate Return on Investment and Secure Funding. Above all 
the enterprise has to be strong enough conceptually and have demon-
strated a positive enough return on investment to attract sufficient donor 
funding to maintain the newly configured initiative.  
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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION  
Akutagawa Ryunosuke’s 1922 short story “In a Grove”, is the kaleidoscopic 
account of seven characters who speak to a magistrate about their knowledge of 
a man found stabbed in the woods near Kyoto. Each account is dissimilar; each 
told from a different vantage point, a vantage point affected by relationships, 
intelligence, memory capacity, value system, self-interest and wishful thinking. 
The authors of this report expected to find a wide variety of interpretations 
about the devolution of IDRC-housed international secretariats. Whether one 
was an initiator of the devolution or not—the leaver or the left—are factors that 
were expected to affect responses to questions about devolution. Further, it was 
anticipated that the perspective of one’s discipline or role in the organization 
(secretariat champion, committee member, legal advisor, human resources man-
ager, auditor, representative from finance, researcher, executive decision maker, 
etc.) would result in a wide variety of views. Astonishingly, this was not the case. 
The degree of corroboration with respect to information provided and docu-
mented was remarkable. With the exception of one or two outlying interpreta-
tions, the information was easily corroborated by multiple sources and verified 
by documentation. However, wide divergences of feelings were elicited. Giving 
up one’s passion, work focus and relationships involved with a specific en-
deavor over a many years can be an emotional experience. The more recent the 
experience, the stronger were the feelings expressed.  
Strictly speaking “devolution” is passing responsibilities to a lower level. Web-
ster’s definition of devolution is: “transference (as of rights, powers, property, or respon-
sibility) to another; especially: the surrender of powers to local authorities by a central govern-
ment …” And Oxford’s is: “the devolving of power by central government to local or re-
gional administration…” It is clear that IDRC does not use the word in this sense. 
When IDRC’s various strategic planning documents refer to devolution as a 
core value it is more in the sense of “Southern empowerment” than passing an 
asset or responsibility on to a subsidiary or lesser power. As used in this study, 
devolution covers the acts of: setting up commercial corporations; establishing 
new legal entities; graduating from a proof of concept stage to an external operation; 
absorption by a federal department; fragmenting into several parts; and termina-
tion. The present examination of devolution refers to the act of transferring 
primary responsibility for an activity, in parts or in whole, to another entity en-
tailing the passing-off to another legally constituted organization, whether pre-
existing or created for the purpose. Further clarity is provided by IDRC’s Cor-
porate Strategy and Program Framework (CSPF, paragraph 117):  
“Devolution involves the passing of substantive and managerial control of an activity 
housed within the Centre to an external agency. Historically, the Centre has housed ac-
tivities within its structure and then devolved them for three reasons: 
 An activity may have been “incubated” at the Centre until an appropriate final 
locale, be it an existing institution or a newly created one, was found; 
 The Centre’s belief in capacity building, and in not “hanging on” to activities; and 
“Devolution is a process whereby 
something is moved from within the 
corporate entity of IDRC to exist on 
its own or within another host or-
ganization. The essential distinction 
is that it has a separate legal 
status…The benefits of devolution 
include: increased attractiveness to 
donors who are generally more will-
ing to fund Southern based pro-
grams; and the fact that devolved 
organizations do not have to con-
form to IDRC rules and procedures 
that are sometimes bureaucratic”  
Key Informant 
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 A hitherto in-house activity will grow, programmatically and in size, to the point 
where it would be more appropriate to spin it off as an independent entity or to 
another institution.” 
1.1 A USER FOCUSED EVALUATION: METHODOLOGY  
The principal client for this review is IDRC’s senior management who will be 
the primary users of the findings as will program staff involved in future devolu-
tions. These study patrons indicated that two other program initiatives were 
presently being devolved (telecentre.org and Climate Change Adaptation in Af-
rica) and that the results of the study were needed relatively quickly. As such, an 
initial meeting was held between the authors and IDRC’s Vice Presidents Ro-
hinton Medhora (Programs) and Lauchlan Munro (Corporate Strategy and Re-
gional Management) at the onset of the project. Individual follow-up meetings, a 
findings review workshop and meeting with senior officials to review the draft 
report were held to confirm key findings, conclusions and to ensure that the 
results would be useful to the primary users.  
As observed by the Vice Presidents, IDRC has been involved in a number of 
devolutions of various initiatives or secretariats during the past two decades. 
However, each time devolution occurs it seemed as though it was being done 
for the first time. While this is not entirely surprising because each initiative or 
secretariat is unique in most respects, it was believed that it was time to encode 
some of the experiences with devolution and to encapsulate lessons. However, 
because of the uniqueness and dynamic nature of each situation, the principle 
users of the evaluation wanted, in capsule form, the vital few critical lessons 
learned from IDRC’s experience with devolution. For the same reason, they 
made it clear that a “check-list” would not be as helpful as a set of “guiding 
principles”.   
The first step in the study was to select a sample of devolved secretariats to re-
view. After excluding the obvious outliers and considering factors such as rea-
sons for devolution, geographic location, degrees of success, donor make-up 
and time since devolution, seven devolved secretariats were identified for inclu-
sion.1 The next step was to review relevant documentation and interview 37 key 
informants. In addition to 37 interviews, five written responses to the interview 
questionnaire were provided2. Nine people participated in the Findings Work-
shop and eight contributed to the strengthening of the report at the Draft Re-
view. Details of these processes are found in Appendix A: Workplan and Ap-
proach. Appendix B is a list of documents reviewed. Key informants inter-
viewed and individuals participating in the Findings Review Workshop and Re-
view of Draft Report are listed in Appendix C. 
                                                 
1 Micronutrient Initiatives (MI); Trade and Industrial Policy Secretariat (TIPS); Secretariat for 
Industrial Support for Economic Research in Africa (SISERA); International Model Forest Net-
work Secretariat (IMFNS); Bellanet; International Network for Bamboo and Rattan (INBAR); and 
African Economic Research Consortium (AERC). 
2 A number of respondents covered more than one case including headquarters responsibilities. 
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1.2 CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS 
The main methodological constraint was the time frame for the study.  Engag-
ing key IDRC stakeholders was not difficult. They shared their views and sup-
porting documentation generously. However, interviews with representatives of 
donor organizations and former members of secretariat Steering Committees 
were difficult to arrange because of: a) the time frame; and b) the fact that many 
of the individual donor representatives during the devolution process are in 
highly mobile positions, are no longer involved or whose coordinates are no 
longer available. Another difficulty was encountered with obtaining documenta-
tion as IDRC’s central record keeping for devolved secretariats and initiatives is 
weak. In many cases transfer agreements could not be found and in others, min-
utes of devolution deliberations were not kept; went with the devolved initiative 
or are otherwise not in IDRC’s archives. It is clear that the scope of the project 
limited the depth and breadth of the report. However, there was ample data to 
fulfill the needs of the principle users of the evaluation and to address their 
stated objective.  
The following section provides a context for IDRC’s international secretariats, 
including a brief overview of each of the cases reviewed in the study. A more 
detailed description of an “idealized case” of a successful devolution drawn 
from the seven cases reviewed for this study and Bellanet which is at the other 
end of the continuum concludes Section 2. Section 3, Some Evidence from the 
Field, provides an overview of the emerging literature on donor exit strategies 
and experiences of other organizations with processes similar to IDRC devolu-
tion. Section 4 is an analysis of IDRC’s devolution policies and practices and 
process. Section 5, highlights lessons learned and guiding principles for success-
ful devolution. 
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SECTION 2 
THE STORY OF IDRC INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIATS  
“A Summary of the IDRC Act 
The objects of the Centre are to initiate, encourage, support and conduct research into 
the problems of the developing regions of the world and into the means for applying and 
adapting scientific, technical and other knowledge to the economic and social advance-
ment of those regions and, in carrying out those objects: 
(a) To enlist the talents of natural and social scientists and technologists in Canada 
and other countries;  
(b) To assist the developing regions to build up the research capabilities, the innova-
tive skills and the institutions required to solve their problems;  
(c) To encourage generally the coordination of international development research; and  
(d) To foster cooperation in research on development problems between the developed 
and developing regions for their mutual benefit.”  
IDRC Website 
2.1 INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIATS: THE CONTEXT 
International secretariats were seen as one way of assisting IDRC to carry out its 
ambitious mandate. As a modality of research program development and im-
plementation within IDRC, international secretariats have a unique historical 
context. Established in 1992, Micronutrient Initiative (MI) was the first IDRC 
international secretariat. The Strategy for International Fisheries Research 
(SIFR) was a close second with Bellanet coming two years later in 1994. Secre-
tariats emerged as an organizational form capable of more flexibility than 
IDRC’s traditional Program Initiatives. Although the secretariats were “housed” 
in IDRC they were originally expected to operate in a semi-autonomous fash-
ion. This enabled them to more easily collaborate with development partners 
and to more easily attract external funding. Each secretariat has a Steering 
Committee or Advisory Board made up primarily of donor representatives. 
However, as legal entities, secretariats were appendages of IDRC.  
In 1992 IDRC’s Board identified three conditions that define the relationship 
between an international secretariat and IDRC: 
1. The secretariat’s operations would be subject to the Centre’s adminis-
trative policies and practices; 
2. All administrative costs were to be reimbursed by donor contributions 
to IDRC; and 
3. Objects were to be closely linked to IDRC’s existing programs. 
IDRC Internal Audit identified six defining characteristics of a secretariat: 
1. Their operations are supported by IDRC, but are a distinct entity within 
the Centre; 
2. They are active in a field relevant to IDRC’s competence and pro-
gramming; 
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3. They are funded by one or more donors, in addition to IDRC funds; 
4. Their programming is managed by a Steering Committee, often com-
prising representatives of the sponsoring organizations and experts in 
the field; 
5. They implement the program of work approved by the Committee; and 
6. They conduct their work over a fixed period of time.4 
Based on a major review of international secretariats in 1998 (Learning Partner-
ships, Armstrong and Whyte), IDRC developed Guidelines for secretariats and a 
Strategic Framework for secretariats further articulating the role of the advi-
sory/steering committees, accountability relationships between donors and 
IDRC, and the responsibilities of secretariat executive directors with IDRC’s 
Board. 
In July 2005 Whyte and Auger identified 15 organizations that met the defining 
characteristics of an international secretariat. They point out (as was done in the 
1998 study) that only eight of this number had formal approval from IDRC’s 
Board of Governors. Others were considered Quasi-secretariats that were ap-
proved as “special projects” rather than secretariats. Table 1 below shows these 
15 and their current status: three have been spun off as separate legal entities 
MI, ATPS, TIPS; one became an International Intergovernmental Agency (IN-
BAR); and one became a Canadian Corporation (WETV). Three were incorpo-
rated into IDRC programming (involution) and the remaining four closed. 
Resembling these 15 secretariats are several other initiatives that appear on a list 
of 20 secretariats prepared seven years earlier by the same author. They include: 
VISED (Vietnam-Indochina Sustainable Development Program; NEPED (En-
vironmental Protection and Economic Development); IWOKRAMA (Interna-
tional Rainforest Program); EHIP (Essential Health Interventions Project; and 
CONNEPP (National Environment Policy Transition Project).  
Whyte and Auger’s 2005 report maintains that IDRC policy is unambiguous 
about the fact that secretariats should not have open-ended time frames; rather, 
there should be a planned evolution and game-plan. They also come to this sig-
nificant conclusion:  
“Another reality is that today IDRC is implementing many multi-funded projects and 
programs, some of which have international advisory committees, so that the somewhat 
unique character of the secretariats as they appeared in the 1990s no longer holds. No 
new secretariats have been created since 1997.” 
Like the other initiatives emerging from IDRC mentioned previously, similar 
entities have emerged since 1997 and are also candidates for devolution. The 
two current candidates for devolution telecentre.org and Climate Change Adap-
tation in Africa are examples. It seems that Program Initiatives have developed 
the capacity to take on secretariat characteristics making the need to understand 
devolution as relevant now as in the days of rapidly emerging secretariats.  
                                                 
4 Six characteristics on page 8 of Dr. Jim Armstrong and Dr. Anne Whyte’s “Learning 
Partnerships: a Review of IDRC Secretariats,” Volume 1, November 19, 1998 taken 
from “Guidelines for Secretariats Housed at IDRC.” 
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Table 1: IDRC Housed International Secretariats5 
Start Acronym Name Location Status 
MI Micronutrients Initiative Ottawa/Delhi Canadian NGO  
1992 
SIFR 









ment Program for SE Asia 
Singapore 
Involuted as an IDRC 
PI 
ATPS 
African Technology Policy 
Secretariat 
Nairobi NGO in Kenya 
1993 
OCEEI 
Office for Central and 
Eastern Europe Initiative 
Ottawa Closed 2004 
Bellanet Bellanet Initiative Ottawa Devolved/Closed 
1994 
RITC 




International Model Forest 
Network 
Ottawa 
Part of Government 
of Canada 
INBAR 
International Network for 
Bamboo and Rattan 






Trade and Industry Secre-
tariat 





Singapore Networked (TRF) 
SISERA 
Secretariat for Institutional 
Support for Economic 
Research in Africa 
Dakar Closed 2006 
1997 
FOODLINKS Foodlinks Ottawa Closed 2003 
2.2 VARIATIONS ON THE DEVOLUTION THEME  
The following examples encapsulate seven stories of the devolution process at 
IDRC. Each offers unique lessons that, for the first time, are being analyzed and 
documented.  
2.2.1 MICRONUTRIENT INITIATIVES (MI) 7 
The Micronutrient Initiative (MI) was formed in January 1992 as an interna-
tional secretariat within IDRC. During the first 10 years of its existence, MI 
worked to raise awareness of malnutrition and hunger in developing countries 
through advocacy, expanding the application of known solutions (vitamin A 
supplementation and salt iodization) and on developing innovative solutions, 
such as products for children and double-fortified salt, to ensure that micronu-
trients reached vulnerable populations cost-effectively. 
At its October 2000 meeting, IDRC’s Board of Governors approved the devo-
lution of MI. In 2002, MI was devolved to an independent not-for-profit corpo-
ration registered in Canada. Over time, its focus has shifted from an emphasis 
on global advocacy and product development to more direct country level sup-
port. Working in close partnership  with governments, the private sector, UN 
                                                 
5 Table taken from: Robert Auger and Anne Whyte, “Future Directions for Bellanet”, 
July, 2005. 
6 International Intergovernmental Organization 
7
 For further information on MI go to www.micronutrient.org  
“In the case of Secretariats that were 
not devolved [closed], the major chal-
lenge was finding the appropriate host. 
In the case of SISERA, the organiza-
tion did not have the research or fund-
ing capacity to manage autonomously. 
Although negotiations with IDEP 
(UN) were started, eventually it was 
too complex and extensive and there 
were no other options.” 
Key Informant 
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agencies and civil society, MI  has contributed to global progress over the past 
15 years through the provision of support for supplies of vitamin A supple-
ments that benefit over 200 million children annually in 70 countries; increasing 
the production and marketing of iodized salt to reach up to 300 million people 
in over 10 countries; and supporting the expansion of fortification of staple 
foods and condiments in over 20  countries. MI is regarded globally as a signifi-
cant advocate for policy and program action on behalf of vulnerable popula-
tions. MI provides technical and financial assistance; secures services; and sup-
ports the development, implementation and monitoring of solutions for hidden 
hunger. 
2.2.2 TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY SECRETARIAT (TIPS) 8 
TIPS was established in 1996 at the request of the South African Department of 
Trade and Industry. In the post apartheid period, the need to strengthen Gov-
ernment capacity in the formulation and execution of trade and industrial policy 
was deemed a high priority. The Secretariat was hosted within IDRC's Regional 
Office for South Africa, until it became a Section 21 Company in 2001 when 
IDRC closed the ROSA. TIPS is now an independent, non-profit economic 
research institution. TIPS was intended to be a source of independent economic 
policy and research leadership to government and civil society in South Africa 
and the region. By all estimates, TIPS has been one of IDRC’s most successful 
secretariats, “…the quality and relevance of policy research supported by it has improved 
steadily as gauged by its principal client, the DTI as well as more distanced observers in South 
African universities and international knowledge networks.”9 A 2008 review of TIPS 
reveals that as TIPS has expanded its research focus outside of its core mandate 
of trade and industrial policy and its position as an economic think tank has 
weakened considerably. In addition, its financial situation is somewhat tenuous. 
There is however still a great deal of support for the organization to revert to its 
role as thought leader in the fields of international trade, industrial development 
and economic regulation. 
2.2.3 SECRETARIAT FOR INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH IN AFRICA (SISERA) 10 
In July 1997, IDRC, in collaboration with USAID and the Canadian Interna-
tional Development Agency (CIDA), set up SISERA in Dakar, Senegal. SIS-
ERA’s mandate was to strengthen the economic research capacity of African 
economic research organizations to facilitate the development of indigenous 
solutions as well as establish these organizations as internationally renowned 
centres of excellence. Core grants of up to CAD $300,000 were provided to 
partner organizations to cover the costs of research support facilities and pro-
jects and to help researchers participate in seminars and publish their work. The 
Secretariat also awarded seed grants of up to CAD $50,000 to emerging centres 
– organizations with less capacity to absorb resources. SISERA was governed by 
a Steering Committee, including representatives of the Economic Commission 
                                                 
8
 For further information on TIPS go to www.tips.org.za  
9
 TIPS: Report of an External Evaluation. J. Fine and D.Stryker. March 2001 
10 See ‘Learning Partnerships: A Review of IDRC Secretariats’ by Jim Armstrong and 
Anne Whyte, IDRC November (1998) for a comprehensive case study on SISERA as 
well as ‘Building Organizational Research Capacity: SISERA, A Case Study’ 
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for Africa, the African Economic Research Consortium, the Association of Af-
rican Universities and the African Development Bank. The Steering Committee 
reported to IDRC’s Board of Governors. 
For almost nine years, IDRC housed the Secretariat and was the driving force 
behind its operation in Sub-Saharan Africa. A relatively small staffing comple-
ment of six, administered an annual budget that ranged from CAD $2.1 million 
(1997-1999) to CAD $3.6 million (2002/2003), SISERA provided core grants, 
seed grants and technical assistance to 19 institutions and networks in Africa. In 
addition to IDRC, USAID and CIDA, other donors included the Cooperation 
Française, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGIS), the European 
Union and the African Development Bank. SISERA ceased operations on 
March 31, 2006. 
2.2.4 INTERNATIONAL MODEL FOREST NETWORK SECRETARIAT 
(IMFNS) 11 
IMFN aims to stimulate the field-level application of new concepts and ideas in 
sustainable forest management in forest ecosystems throughout the world and 
to create opportunities to demonstrate and share these experiences. Between 
1992 and 1994, the program was housed within Natural Resource Canada’s Ca-
nadian Forest Service (CFS), and was funded by the Canadian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). In 1995, the management 
body of the IMFN was reconstituted as a secretariat, within International De-
velopment Research Centre (IDRC). The aim of this move was to draw on 
IDRC’s international experience and management to build and secure accep-
tance of the model forest concept on a global basis. Some 12 years later, IMFN 
ceased operations as an IDRC secretariat and moved back to the Canadian For-
ests Service in 2007. Since its devolution from IDRC, the model forests global 
brand has grown; the network has expanded from 17 to 30 countries and actual 
model forests sites have increased from 30 (under IDRC) to 50. 
2.2.5 BELLANET 
Bellanet was created in 1994, as an IDRC secretariat headquartered in Ottawa. 
Its mandate was to increase the impact of development programming by sup-
porting broader collaboration through more effective use of ICTs. Bellanet’s 
major objectives were to build organizational capacity in the use of ICTs for 
collaboration, identify and mitigate challenges to effective collaboration, build 
capacity in developing country institutions and share and apply lessons learned.  
Among other things, the organization has sustained permanent research proc-
esses about topics related to knowledge networks, communities of practice, 
knowledge sharing, knowledge management, social networking, social tagging, 
web 2.0 tools, virtual communities, online facilitation, face to face facilitation 
and moderation, participatory processes and collaborative research, among 
many others.   Bellanet also develops research in tools and techniques such as 
the peer assist, after action review, open spaces, world cafe, graphic stories, digi-
                                                 
11
  See Armstrong and Whyte (1998) for ‘International Model Forest Network Secre-
tariat: A Case Study’ and www.imfn.net ; 2007-2012 Strategy Outline for IMFN, January 
2007. 
“IDRC took a brand new idea, incu-
bated it well and when the time was 
right, supported it to stand on its own. 
The IMFN has been allowed to grow 
and thrive and is now a vibrant global 
network. Senior Management at 
IDRC was immensely supportive 
during the period that IMFN was 
within IDRC and during the devolu-
tion process. The management of 
IMFN was given considerable auton-
omy and flexibility to pursue its man-
date. Other departments of IDRC 
were also very generous with their time, 
including HR, Finance. IMFN also 
benefited (credibility, legitimacy) from 
IDRC’s reputation. IDRC’s corpo-
rate culture was ideal for nurturing 
IMFN and would have been impossi-
ble in a federal government depart-
ment. IMFN has also gained benefits 
from its transition to a federal govern-
ment department; Natural Resource 
Management. It has more political 
clout globally and access to resources. 
For example, IMFN just secured $15 
million for work in Africa. IMFN is 
now embraced by other federal depart-
ments as ‘one of their own’ and recog-
nized as a key agency in the Canadian 
government.” 
Key Informant 
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tal story telling, podcasting, and digital documentation (audio, photo and video), 
among others. 
In the years 2003-2004 Bellanet pursued establishment of regional presences 
through partnerships with existing local organizations.  Bellanet Asia is hosted 
by the South Asian Partnership International (SAP international) in Nepal; Bel-
lanet Africa is hosted by AITEC in Uganda, and in Costa Rica, Súla Batsú 
hosted Bellanet for Latin America and the Caribbean. The shift to the South 
occasioned by the establishment of these regional presences was finalized with 
the closure of the Ottawa headquarters in December 2007. An agreement with 
Súla Batsú was signed in 2008 aimed at transitioning Bellanet to an independent 
network outside of IDRC. IDRC has allocated $200,000 to support staff costs, 
positioning of the Network, development of its own spaces and establishing 
partnerships and alliances. Complementary funding is also being provided by 
the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation to support the process of capi-
talization of the knowledge that was generated over the years. 
2.2.6 INTERNATIONAL NETWORK FOR BAMBOO AND RATTAN (INBAR)12 
INBAR was initially nurtured as an IDRC secretariat between 1984 and 1997. 
On November 6th, 1997, nine countries signed an Establishment Agreement 
creating INBAR as an independent international organization with financial 
support extended by IDRC, IFAD, the Government of The Netherlands, and 
The People’s Republic of China. 
The mission of INBAR as given in Article 3 of the Agreement  is to improve 
the well-being of producers and users of bamboo and rattan within the context 
of a sustainable bamboo and rattan resource base by consolidating, coordinating 
and supporting strategic and adaptive research and development. The organiza-
tion administers  three main thematic programs – Environmental Sustainability, 
Livelihoods and Economic Development and Trade Development with four 
technical program – Global Bamboo Housing Program, Global Marketing Ini-
tiative, Global Rattan Program, and the Non-Timber Forest Products Partner-
ship Program, all supported by the Public Awareness, External Relations and 
Networking and Partnership Units.   
In 10 years INBAR membership grew from 9 to 34 member countries and or-
ganizations, Asia (11), Africa (12), Latin America (10), and North America (1). 
There are now regional offices in Ecuador, India, and Ghana, with country rep-
resentation in the Philippines, Italy and Colombia, and over 130 affiliates all 
around the world. 
2.2.7 AFRICAN ECONOMIC RESEARCH CONSORTIUM (AERC)13  
With a history spanning over 20 years, AERC is often referred to as the antece-
dent to IDRC-housed international secretariats. It began in 1984 when IDRC 
brought together two groups (academics from universities in East Africa, Nai-
robi and Dar es Salaam and the economics department at the University of To-
ronto) determined to revive economic research in Africa and funded the Macro-
                                                 
12 For further information on INBAR go to www.inbar.int 
13 For further information on AERC go to www.aercafrica.org 
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economic Analysis Network Project for Eastern and Southern Africa.14 It began 
by offering small research grants in the region and coordinating a network of 
economists. The feasibility of devolving the project to a regional institution and 
assessing funding strategies was formally initiated in 1985. By 1987 the value of 
the project was proven and, under the inspired vision and leadership of Jeffrey 
Fine, the idea of a multi-donor funded organization was launched. Later in the 
same year an International Research Consortium Sponsoring Group, funded by 
the Rockefeller Foundation was established. This Group decided to create a 
stand-alone organization. Other donors including CIDA, the World Bank and 
USAID quickly got on board.   
The success of AERC is well documented. During its first two decades of op-
eration some 17 external evaluations and other reviews were carried out giving 
the organization “high marks for both its governance and its programming, 
while recommending various improvements.”15 One of the unique characteris-
tics of this example is the early recognition that independence and good govern-
ance were both important. Early on it established a three-pillar governance 
structure:  
1. A Board responsible for fund raising, key appointments, finance and 
policy oversight; 
2. An Advisory Committee responsible for the research agenda and pro-
gram; and  
3. A secretariat to carry out the program. 
Another defining characteristic of AERC and a contributor to its longevity and 
success was the fact that early on, the Board made the investment of time and 
effort in laying a solid organizational foundation including:  African ownership; 
good governance; committed funding; clear divisions of responsibilities; solid 
strategies and plans; research independence; leadership; succession planning; 
technical/managerial processes.  
2.3 SUCCESSFUL DEVOLUTION EXPERIENCES  
IDRC’s mixed experience with devolution has certainly yielded several good 
practices particularly in the cases of the African Economic Research Consor-
tium (AERC), the Trade and Industrial Policy Secretariat (TIPS), the Interna-
tional Model Forest Network Secretariat (IMFNS) and the Micronutrient Initia-
tive (MI).   
Even in the case of the Secretariat for Institutional Support for Economic Re-
search in Africa (SISERA) which ‘failed’, a good practice can be discerned in the 
early efforts of SISERA’s Steering Committee to prepare for devolution by 
commissioning a comprehensive study on the feasibility of creating a new and 
independent non-profit entity in Senegal. SISERA is in fact, one of the few cas-
es in which deliberate planning for devolution was identified and the current 
efforts to begin planning for devolution of telecentre.org approximately two 
years prior to its closure suggests that IDRC recognizes the importance of early 
planning. 
                                                 
14
 Caroline Pestieau. Twenty Years of Capacity Building in sub-Saharan Africa. 2008 
15
 Caroline Pestieau. Twenty Years of Capacity Building in Sub-Saharan Africa. 2008 
“The history of several other multi-
donor networks set up in the 1980s 
and 1990s shows that continuing to 
operate under the authority and using 
the procedures of the “lead donor” can 
stifle a new organization’s growth and 
lead to unexpected problems.” 
Caroline Pestieau,  
AERC History, 2008 
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The importance of investing energy, time and financial resources in planning is 
further supported by the experience of AERC in developing a three pillar gov-
ernance structure that, some 20 years later, ensures efficient and effective man-
agement of AERC’s strategic, administrative and research arms. AERC’s entire 
devolution experience might very well constitute the very ‘best practice’ in devo-
lution, not only because there seemed to be a unified vision by the consortium 
of donors on the need for an independent AERC, or because the process was 
driven by the then Executive Director, Jeff Fine, but also due to the excellent 
systems that were established by him (in collaboration with the Deputy Direc-
tor) prior to his departure, 10 years after establishing AERC as an independent 
entity. Bassey and Yeo (2009) note: “…this devolution, while very rapid in comparison 
to some of the other experiences…was a success in the short term and remains a success some 
twenty years later. AERC is widely recognized as one of the most well run, transparent and 
effective organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa….”16 
In the majority of cases reviewed, early planning for devolution was limited, 
however, it is certainly significant that even in cases where a ‘forced’ devolution 
was initiated, as in the case of TIPS, a project management approach to the 
process coupled with IDRC’s support and excellent leadership ‘on the ground’, 
contributed to a well executed devolution experience.    
As one of its ‘flagship’ programs in South Africa, IDRC devoted the necessary 
support and resources to ensure that TIPS was established as a credible non-
profit. One respondent involved in the TIPS devolution noted that, “… IDRC 
did an immense job in devolving TIPS to a stable, administratively sound entity…this was not 
a rush job… IDRC ensured that all the elements were covered.” Other respondents have 
noted that the ‘arbitrary date’ set for the TIPS devolution signified weak ‘plan-
ning’; however the fact that TIPS was devolved within 11 months of IDRC’s 
decision to close the Regional Office for South Africa speaks to the efficiency 
of the process. When one considers that the closure of ROSA—the largest Re-
gional office with an estimated 70 staff members—and devolution of Schoolnet 
were occurring simultaneously with the devolution of TIPS, the achievement is 
even more astounding17. A sound project management approach has been cred-
ited for the efficiency of the process, “… maybe because I am so obsessive about being 
organized, a clear plan with tasks and timelines was developed very early in the process”. 
One of the most significant practices that emerged from the TIPS devolution 
was the deliberate focus on and sensitivity to “people” issues. As one respon-
dent noted, “people were losing their jobs”. The effort invested in clear and ongoing 
communication with staff of the ROSA, TIPS and Schoolnet at every stage of 
the process effectively facilitated what could have been a very painful process. 
Regular weekly meetings chaired by the ROSA Staff Association, open consulta-
tions via video conference with Ottawa and staff meetings independent of sen-
ior management occurred throughout the process. IDRC’s support to the RO-
SA based staff18  through the contracting of a recruitment firm was also highly 
appreciated. 
                                                 
16
 Michael Bassey and Stephen Yeo, “Devolution of the CCAA Program: Experience to 
Date and Strategic Options”. Interim Report, April 2009. 
17
 Further investigation into the management of this process may yield additional ‘best 
practices’ related to decommissioning of Regional Offices and devolution of programs. 
18
 Locally based ROSA staff would have been due for termination with the closure of 
the office. 
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In each of the ‘successful’ devolutions, the process appears to have been the 
least traumatic when a total transfer of staff was undertaken. This was especially 
true in the cases of MI, IMFNS, AERC and TIPS. However, this practice is 
generally associated with the creation of an independent entity, except in the 
case of IMFNS which involved the transfer to a Federal Department of the Ca-
nadian Government. As such, it is a practice that should be based on rigorous 
analysis of the best ‘devolution’ option, rather than a practice that should gener-
ally be employed regardless of the final option. 
The provision of core funding and in some cases legacy funding has been criti-
cal to ensuring that the devolved entity has a solid foundation. The provision of 
core funding in particular has been crucial, since other donors generally only 
provide program related funding. Until these newly independent entities can 
devise strategies to generate the necessary revenue to cover operational costs, 
IDRC’s allocation vital.  
Finally, there is a link between the success of a devolved initiative and its gov-
ernance structure. In Twenty Years of Capacity Building in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(2008) Caroline Pestieau makes a very strong case that AERC’s longevity and 
success is attributable to its well thought out governance structure including 
clear accountability, decision making, division of labor, and refined management 
processes.  
2.4 BELLANET — LESSONS IN DEVOLUTION 
Following a two year collaborative process by a consortium of international 
agencies, it was determined that there was a need for better ICT coordination 
and collaboration within the development community resulting in the 1994 crea-
tion of Bellanet as a secretariat within IDRC.  As such, Bellanet was legally part 
of and accountable to IDRC. However, a steering committee of donors guided 
program and budget decisions. During its first five years Bellanet provided ad-
vice, technical assistance and capacity building in the use of ICTs for develop-
ment collaboration among multi-stakeholder partnerships.  
In 1997 an internal evaluation focusing on improving the impact and effect of 
Bellanet’s activities on donors of Bellanet’s programs and activities was under-
taken by Michael Graham. Foreseeing a fatal but persistently unaddressed flaw, 
the report notes that: “The donors…are Bellanet’s major conundrum. The representatives 
of the funders endorse and support Bellanet’s mandate but the institutions demonstrated very 
limited buy-in to the philosophy of transparency and sharing of information.” As part of a 
larger review of IDRC’s secretariat Modality, Bellanet was again assessed in 
1999 (Armstrong and Whyte). This study confirmed the initial success of the 
initiative and reflected Bellanet’s strategy to raise awareness of its services and 
activities and to promote its role as an expert in ICT-based collaborative sup-
port within the development context. 
In 2000 Bellanet moved into its second phase marked by strategic decisions to 
focus more energy on the dynamics of collaborative processes, learning and 
knowledge sharing, and increased direct engagement with Southern partners. 
Several successful initiatives in training for development, workspace collabora-
tion, open standards and knowledge management attracted more strategic part-
ners. 
“Thinking on it [devolution of Bel-
lanet] started as far back as 1999. 
The actual process started in 2004 and 
has continued until relatively recently. 
The devolution of Bellanet was gener-
ally ineffective and was a ‘failure of 
vision and leadership’. Staff in Ottawa 
(core staff) and program staff in the 
regional NGOs were involved through-
out the process, however it is psychologi-
cally difficult to manage the ‘devolution’ 
of something in which you have invested 
energy and passion” 
Key Informant 
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In 2003 the organization decided that it would undertake an external evaluation 
to map its directions for the future.  This review (The Governance Network™) 
identified a number of significant strengths upon which Bellanet could build. 
However, it also pointed out that, from among the many development players 
with similar or complementary objectives, it was critical for Bellanet to carve out 
a differentiating niche within its overall mandate. While recognizing Bellanet’s 
significant achievements, there was no consensus or agreement among the many 
people consulted about what should be Bellanet’s specific niche. Rather, it was 
recognized as a nimble organization able to meet rapidly evolving needs primar-
ily through capacity building and that Bellanet should continually be “working 
itself out of a job”. The 2003 report recommended: refocusing activity and re-
sources on the South; and leveraging limited resources. Several specific and stra-
tegic management improvements were identified such as the establishment of 
client service standards, implementation of client feedback mechanisms, formal-
ization of business practices and improved financial management and monitor-
ing and evaluation. The report also identified many potential areas for Bellanet 
to focus on in the future, for example: sharing lessons learned and best prac-
tices, active facilitation, leadership as opposed operations and a number of areas 
to move away from for example: software development, ISP services, and ICT 
training.  
Based on this study and its recommendations Bellanet organized a strategic 
planning session and developed its strategic direction for Phase 3 (2004-2009) 
that was centered upon: a shift to the South; a concentrated focus on exploring 
open development; and the development of options for devolution. 
In May 2005 Bellanet International Steering Committee (BISC) considered six 
alternatives for Bellanet’s future (migration, spin-off, alliance, dispersion, involu-
tion and merger) only two of which the BISC found worth exploring further; 
namely involution or spin off. Based on this decision, another examination of 
Bellanet was commissioned (Whyte and Auger) to explore future directions for 
Bellanet. A decision about the secretariat’s future was deemed necessary because 
of the identification of: the fact that Bellanet’s programs had become increas-
ingly separate from IDRC’s mandate; the loss of one of its core donors; trouble-
some financial projections (a shortfall of $880,000 was projected by the end of 
Phase 3); and notice given by IDRC that Bellanet would not continue in its cur-
rent form past the end of Phase 3 (March 2007).  
Whyte and Auger explored two scenarios for the future of the secretariat: 1. 
involution into IDRC programming; and 2. spin-off options. The report ob-
served that other secretariats required a 24-36 month period of intensive work 
to accomplish this type of transition process. Both scenarios would require staff 
downsizing, a change in programming activities, continuation of some regional 
presence, commitment of continued funding from donor partners and a $1.65 
million contribution by IDRC over the first three years of a potential Phase 4. 
Given the deadline set by IDRC, Bellanet had only 20 months. In some cases, 
like MI, transformation could be done in 18 months because no physical move 
was involved and no financial commitment from donors needed to be secured. 
Even then, intensive participation of the President, Vice President, Director of 
Finance and Administration, and Corporate Counsel were required throughout 
the period of MI devolution. 
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The 2005 report correctly predicts that Bellanet’s “…transition is going to be a diffi-
cult time for management and staff as they wrestle with their own work and deal with the addi-
tional tasks of the uncertainty that the transformation will bring.” 
In March 2007, BISC developed a four year devolution strategy for Bellanet and 
reconfirmed their commitment to the initiative. During a May Bellanet staff re-
treat participants focused on developing a program for Bellanet’s devolution 
which, it was decided, would incorporate three elements: a) support to Informa-
tion Communications Technology and Knowledge Sharing research projects; b) 
strengthening the Bellanet network; and c) building organizational capacity.  
In June a Bellanet Proposal Development Workshop to discuss and refine these 
proposals was held in Costa Rica.  During July and August, the results of the 
workshop were submitted to and reviewed by IDRC officials whose comments 
were incorporated into the program plan. With contracts expiring at the end of 
September, staff continued to believe that at least some of them would have a 
role within the adjusted program and believed that management was encourag-
ing them to develop program ideas.  
In July 2007, IDRC was informed that it would be one of the first organizations 
to undergo the Government of Canada’s new Strategic Review process con-
ducted by Cabinet’s Treasury Board. The review began in August. The Strategic 
Review process called for IDRC to identify its lowest priority, poorest perform-
ing programs and Bellanet was in this group and it was decided to close the se-
cretariat. However, Treasury Board took several months to announce the deci-
sion. During this protracted period of time, all deliberations were protected by 
Canada’s strict policy on cabinet secrecy covering advice to ministers. Therefore 
it was the equivalent of putting the entire discussion about Bellanet under a 
“cone of silence”. 
It was not until October 31st, that Michael Clarke, IDRC’s Director of Informa-
tion and Communications Technologies for Development had the information 
to be able to formally announced Bellanet’s devolution “…to its Southern partners 
where it will continue its mission to strengthen networking and innovate in the areas of ICTs 
for development. The move will be completed by July 5, 2008.” In the same memo, staff 
are informed about the disposition of various activities: Súla Batsú and BISC 
would be assisted in identifying future collaborations in the amount of up to 
$200,000; Knowledge Management for Development would be migrated to a 
new host; ICCO, a Dutch NGO would be taking over management of the email 
discussion platform D-groups and that D-Groups would be housed at IGLOO 
in Waterloo.  
Following many months of negotiation and the consideration of four versions 
of a proposal by Súla Batsú, on June 17th 2008 a transfer agreement between 
IDRC and Súla Batsú was signed transferring the Bellanet website. Continuing 
his October 31st memo to IDRC staff, Mr. Clarke wrote: 
“This continues a tradition within IDRC of initiating, incubating and promoting new 
approaches to development that reach a degree of maturity and are then handed off to 
research partners in the South where they can respond more directly to the needs and 
realities of the developing world. I am confident that in this case, our Southern partners 
will be able to continue to pursue the mission of Bellanet successfully and further 
strengthen it as a functional network operating on a global scale.” 
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In November staff attempted to work towards mitigating a situation of having 
what they believed to be a three year transition period reduced to two months. 
The devolution of Bellanet was successful in that the Treasury Board and man-
agement decision to devolve parts and close others was implemented relatively 
quickly. However, from a process point of view, it was a rather messy devolu-
tion. Considerable stress was experienced by staff, and to a lesser extent, net-
work partners. Productivity during this period was understandably minimal. All 
key informants agree that not enough attention was given to the people aspects 
of the process nor enough sensitivity displayed with respect to the difficulty of 
working in an environment of uncertainty. As reflected in the documentation, 
the only mention of a change management strategy dealing with the human 
element was a passing reference in the 2005 Whyte and Auger report. This was 
an overlooked area that required considerable management attention. The lack 
of attention to change management or transition strategy was exacerbated by the 
slow and lingering decision making process and 10 years of deliberation about 
Bellanet’s devolution. In addition, throughout the long deliberation and deci-
sion-taking process, communications continued to be confused or absent. To 
this date, “... most people believe that Bellanet is closed, but nobody knows what this really 
means.” It is not surprising that some staff were left with the feeling that IDRC 
reneged on commitments made to staff, partners and donors to support a three 
year transition strategy.  
Another issue reflected in the Bellanet experience is the alignment of the core 
principles of strengthening research institutions in the South through devolution 
of research and responsibility versus actual managerial behavior. According to 
another former official, “…devolution assumes the surrendering of control and what really 
made it difficult was that staff within IDRC did not buy into the devolution and resisted let-
ting go.” As indicated by several informants, neither staff nor partners had 
bought into the significant change that devolution involves. 
Indeed there were many twists and turns along the way to the wrap-up of Bel-
lanet. Following IDRC’s decision to “involute” and a great deal of work produc-
ing a prospectus for this strategy, donor commitment did not come through as 
quickly as anticipated and the decision to devolve was taken. It is further re-
ported that Southern partners, who were extensively involved in the involution 
strategy, were not involved in discussions regarding this change or in the subse-
quent devolution strategy.  
2.5 OVERVIEW OF DEVOLUTION EXPERIENCES  
There are a small number of interrelated factors, reported respondents, that led 
to better or worse experiences with devolution. In no order of importance, 
these factors include: 
1. Secretariat Leadership: it was strongly maintained that the strength of 
the executive director was a critical contributing factor to the success of 
individual experiences with devolution. Components of leaders cited 
were vision, access to senior decision makers, subject area knowledge 
and expertise, and communication and managerial skills. 
2. State of Devolution Planning: here the use of the term planning is 
not limited to a detailed set of specific action steps, time tables and re-
sponsibility matrices. It refers more to the Mintzbergian notion of 
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planning as future thinking and a formulated strategy (whether docu-
mented or not) encompassing a relatively clear idea of the organiza-
tion’s desired direction: “Planning is not a means to create strategy but one to 
operationalize strategies already created by other means…Planners are…the ana-
lysts of the strategy making system…[They] can also scrutinize the viability of 
strategies managers intend to pursue…” 19 In several of the cases examined 
there was evidence that there was a very clear idea about where the or-
ganization was headed and why. Strong planning was evident with rela-
tive devolution failures such as Bellanet and SISERA; however the 
plans were changed or not implementable. 
3. Transition Management was cited as another critical success factor. 
Transition is used in the sense given to it by Bridges in Managing Tran-
sitions: “In the neutral zone20 personnel are overloaded, signals are often mixed, 
and systems are in flux and therefore unreliable. It is only natural that priorities get 
confused, information gets miscommunicated, and tasks go undone. It is also natural 
that with so many things uncertain and frustrating, turnover begins to rise.”21 In 
this regard, some devolution examples reflected a much higher level of 
transition skill and knowledge than did others. 
4. Decision Making: some cases exhibited a lack of clear and decisive 
decision making. The better devolution experiences, for example, were 
acted upon relatively soon after the decision was taken. Indecisive deci-
sion making sent a negative message to staff, donors and partners. Fur-
ther, when donors were involved in the decision making the results of 
both the devolution process and the outcome appear to be better. 
AERC, IMFNS, INBAR and MI are examples.   
5. Involvement of members of the Senior Management Committee 
had, it appears, a direct bearing on the success of the experiences. 
Where one or more executive leaders of IDRC were directly involved, 
the devolution went relatively smoothly. This involvement goes much 
beyond making decisions and providing check lists. It refers to in-
stances where the President or Vice Presidents invested time and en-
ergy in face-to-face communications with staff and donors as well as 
participation in the devolved entity. INBAR and AERC are examples.  
6. Secure Funding was naturally, another key factor in both the way that 
devolution occurred and in the sustainability of the initiative post devo-
lution. Where anticipated funding was in doubt or withdrawn, the devo-
lution experience was most difficult.  
7. Post Devolution Management refers to both the people and systems 
in place to manage the initiative following devolution. In the cases of 
AERC and INBAR, great deal of effort was spent in ensuring that re-
sponsibilities and required competencies were clearly defined and the 
right people were recruited for key positions. Similarly considerable de-
tailed work was undertaken to ensure that effective management sys-
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 H. Mintzberg. Mintzberg on Management 1980. p 77 
20
 The time between knowing things are going to change and knowing what that 
change is and how it is going to affect you. 
21 W. Bridges Managing Transitions, 1991 
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tems such as program management, division of labor, personnel, suc-
cession planning, finance, audit, reporting, monitoring and evaluation 
were put in place immediately after devolution. 
8. Good Governance refers to the accountability and decision making   
frameworks put in place. As it is used here and by key informants, it al-
so encompasses the structure, composition, capacity and continuity of 
the oversight board and the continuation of senior involvement of offi-
cials from IDRC. Again, AERC and INBAR were unique in that con-
siderable attention was paid to ensuring sustainable good governance.  
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SECTION 3 
SOME EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD 
This section of the report will take a brief look at good practice in donor exit or 
transition as a proxy for ‘devolution’ as defined by IDRC. It is important to 
note that the definition, rationale and approach to devolution within IDRC is 
characterized by a great deal of variability and is not synonymous with ‘exit’ or 
transition as employed by most donors22. However, many of the considerations 
that generally apply to donor exit have some relevance. Remember too that on 
several occasions the road to devolving a secretariat has led to closure.  
The focus on development aid effectiveness driven by the Paris Declaration and 
related agreements, has ensured renewed attention to the issue of donor exit 
and/or transition. Even so, the area is still relatively new. A perusal of the avail-
able literature shows that only three significant studies have been completed 
within recent times: Levinger and Mcleod (2002), Rogers and Macias (2004) and 
Gardner, Greenblott and Joubert, (2005) that speak specifically to the issue of 
donor exit/transition. These have informed reviews completed by UNESCO 
and the World Food Program, among others, in assessing their respective ap-
proaches to exit and transition. In addition, several donors have conducted 
studies aimed at informing their respective performance on ‘exit’ including 
USAID (1999) SIDA, Danida, Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Netherlands (2008), DFID (2007). The World Bank’s 2007 publication on 
evaluating global partnerships devotes an entire chapter to ‘Sustainability, Risks 
and Strategies for Devolution and Exit’. 
A range of terms are used to describe the withdrawal or reduction of external 
funds from a country, program, or project including transition, exit, phasing out, 
withdrawal, devolution, graduation, closure and closing-out. According to Lev-
inger and Mcleod (2002) exit strategies can take at least three forms, which are 
also interrelated. 
 Phase Down: a gradual reduction of program activities, utilizing 
local organizations to sustain program benefits while the imple-
menting agency deploys fewer resources. Phasing down is often a 
preliminary state to phasing over and/or phasing out. 
 Phase over: refers to a sponsor’s transfer of program activities to a 
local institution or community which usually involves elements of 
institutional capacity building during program design and imple-
mentation stage. 
 Phase out: refers to a sponsor’s withdrawal of involvement in a 
program without turning it over to another institution to continue 
implementation. Ideally a program or activity is phased out when 
self sustaining changes are achieved, thereby eliminating the need 
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 For example, donor exit or transition anticipates the withdrawal of donor funding, 
whereas IDRC’s Corporate Strategy and Performance Framework (CSPF) specifies nur-
turing of long term relationships and continued involvement as a donor in the post de-
volution phase. 
“’Nothing lasts forever.’ In recent 
years, this bromide has become an 
increasingly apt phrase to describe 
development assistance flows. As de-
mands on ever scarcer development 
resources have grown, more attention 
must now be focused on how donors 
and implementing agencies best extri-
cate themselves from projects that, in 
many instances, have been long-
standing and well regarded. The chal-
lenge, of course, is how to curtail in-
vestments of donor-provided resources 
without shutting down or choking off 
the benefit stream that, in many cases, 
years of ongoing activity have generated. 
In short, how can donors and program 
sponsors ‘exit’ from projects without 
derailing the gains that have been made 
during their period of active support? 
A resolution of the tension between the 
withdrawal of assistance and commit-
ment to the goals of sustainable devel-
opment lies at the heart of successful 
exit strategies.” 
Levinger and McLeod, 2002 
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for external inputs. This often entails a well articulated transition 
strategy that states how the outcomes will be sustained. 
Rogers and Macias (2004) note that the decision on ‘when to exit’ is generally 
based on criteria such as previously agreed time limits, the extent to which the 
program or project has achieved anticipated impacts and the extent to which 
benchmarks or milestones have been achieved. These latter are generally related 
to the program/project’s monitoring and evaluation strategy.  
A recent SIDA Concept Note on Exit Strategies (2005) refers to additional rea-
sons for donor exit such as in the event of an unexpected development in the 
recipient country, program or project. ‘Unexpected developments’ could be as simple 
as a lack of anticipated progress. In this case, the decision to exit might be made 
unilaterally by the primary donor(s). In another scenario, the decision to exit 
might be due to a change in donor country development cooperation policy, 
resources or administrative needs. Given that these latter issues have very little 
to do with recipient countries, the decision to ‘exit’ on this basis can be per-
ceived as inherently unfair and therefore these types of exits are particularly sen-
sitive. This type of exit also raises the issue of ‘partnership ethics’ regarding for 
example the circumstances under which a donor’s unilateral decision to exit is 
morally permissible, “if the exit has an important negative impact on the well being of 
partners or beneficiaries.”23 On a related note, a 2002 study by the Cornerstone 
Consulting Group makes the point that donor obligations are perceived to be 
particularly strong in cases where the donor created or initiated the proposed 
initiative, “…the more active the foundation is in developing and sponsoring an initiative, the 
greater its responsibility to ensure that sustaining resources are secured.”24 
In the development context, ‘exit’ is closely related to sustainability and there-
fore an exit strategy is almost synonymous with a sustainability strategy and 
should be informed by the same concerns. The importance of sustainability is 
highlighted in some of the key principles underpinning successful exit identified 
in the literature. One of the most important principles is that that exit is consid-
ered and planned at the design phase of the initiative. “Planning for exit includes 
ensuring that there is a shared understanding about when exit should occur and establishing a 
transparent process for assessing performance and therefore knowing when to exit.”25 
When donors get the planning phase right, each of the other principles fall al-
most naturally into place. That is, early planning facilitates a focus on results 
including an articulation of the expected outcomes of the initiative based on a 
defined timeline and resources allocated. The documentation of expectations 
ensures that all stakeholders are on the same page (transparency) and have a 
clear understanding of the milestones to be achieved, expected commitments to 
the project by donors, partners and staff over a specific period of time.  Rogers 
and Macias (2004) note that it is critical that there is clarity of communication so 
that exit strategies are known and understood by partners and staff. The exit 
plan must also be flexible enough to ensure that affected parties have enough 
time to prepare themselves for the end or transition of a program but not so 
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  “Exit Strategies-A Concept Note for a Joint Evaluation”, SIDA Department for 
Evaluation and Internal Audit. 2005 
24
 The Cornerstone Consulting Group. (2002) End Games. The Anne Casey Founda-
tion. www.aecf.org  
25
 Nick Davis and Meenakshi Sankar, (2006) “A Practice Review of UNESCO’s Exit 
and Transition Strategies”  
“Exit strategies, when planned with 
partners in advance…ensure better 
program outcomes and encourage 
commitment to program sustainabil-
ity. …an Exit Strategy is in es-
sence, a ‘sustainability plan’.” 
Gardner, Greenblott and Joubert, 
2005 
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Principles Underpinning 
Donor Exit Strategy 
• Early planning 




• Evidence based 
• Learning focused 
• Partnership approach 
In “A Practice Review of UNESCO’s 
Exit and Transition Strategies”, 2006. 
much time that dependency sets in. The plan should involve key partners in the 
design and in ongoing monitoring of the intervention. Such monitoring is criti-
cal to the decision making on ‘exit’ process and would facilitate ongoing dia-
logue among the key stakeholders. The decision to exit should not come as a 
surprise. 
On the basis of these principles, Rogers and Macias (2004) suggest that devel-
oping and implementing an exit strategy should involve: 
 Identification of clear exit criteria such as achievement of impact 
targets, and readiness of the program for phase over. This might 
include the extent to which the required technical and managerial 
capacity has been built and the identification of alternative sources 
of funding.  
 Design of an exit strategy that would include performance mile-
stones linked to a clear timeline. This could signal the ‘triggers’ for 
exit/transition/devolution; 
 The groups, departments and key individuals who need to be in-
volved in the different aspects of the process should be identified 
from the outset and should understand their respective roles in the 
process; 
 The anticipated time frame for exit should be detailed yet flexible. 
All stakeholders should receive ongoing communication; 
 Clear communications should be maintained with all stakeholders 
to ensure that they are all ‘on board’ and are active participants in 
the process; and 
 Where possible, post intervention evaluations should be conducted 
to assess the extent to which program benefits have been sustained 
following the donor’s exit. 
Key recommendations emerging from a 2008 review of 85 country exits26 by 
four donors27  echoed some of those identified by Rogers and Macias including 
the need to: 
 Develop guidelines which are sensitive to exit processes in different 
contexts and reflect different management challenges: Exit as crisis 
management, exiting in a sustainable manner, and exit as transfor-
mation of relations; 
 Make country specific pre-exit assessments. Bilateral donors do 
make this kind of assessments, but mostly focusing on qualifica-
tions for receiving aid. Now the lens should also be turned on aid 
exit and transformation; 
 Develop a tailor-made approach for each force majeure exit; 
 Adopt a more business-like attitude towards aid exit and formulate 
guidelines for good donorship in exit management based on the 
concept of mutual accountability in line with the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness; and 
                                                 
26
 Although this evaluation looked at donor exit from countries, several of the same 
principles regarding programme exit apply. 
27
 SIDA, Danida, Norad and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
“The topic of ‘Exit Strategies’ con-
founds and eludes emergency and devel-
opment practitioners alike. In the 
dynamic context of Southern Africa, 
the mere mention of ‘an exit’…can 
cause panic among communities, 
NGO staff, government and other 
stakeholders.” 
Gardner, Greenblott and Joubert, 2005 
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 Explore options for addressing exit at entry. 
Levinger and McCleod (2002) suggest that the following questions and guiding 
principles should be considered when designing an exit strategy. 
Table 2: Key Considerations for Exit Strategy28 
Element of Exit 
Strategy 
Key Questions Guiding Principles 
Plan for Exit from the 
Earliest Stages of 
Program Design 
• Will we “phase out” activites or hand 
them off to a local actor? 
• What is the appropriate time frame? 
• How will we know  we are on track 
for phase out? 
1. Flexibility 








• What types of organizations should 
we partner with? 
• What will our partners bring to the 
partnership? What will we?  
• How will the partnership prepare for 
exit? 
• To what extent should we partner 
with public sector actors? 
1. Diversity 
2. Complementarity 





• What capacities are needed? 
• What capacities already exist? 
• What indicators will we use to 
monitor progress? 
1. Build on existing capacity 
2. Model (organizational and 
individual)  behaviors 
3. Create environments that 
support new behaviors  
4. Monitor progress 
Mobilize local and 
external resources as 
an exit strategy 
• What inputs will we need to maintain 
services?  
• Who can provide these inputs? To 
what extent are they available locally? 
Externally? 
• To what extent can benefits be 
sustained without continued inputs? 
1. Continue to progress toward 
sustainabiltiy. 
2. To the extent possible, 
generate resources locally. 
3. Increasingly, bring external  
resources under local control 
and management. 
Stagger phase out of 
various activites 
• What are the key elements of the 
program? Which elements are 
dependent on others?  
1.  Consider providing new 
activites or types of support, as 
financial resources are phased 
out 
Allow roles and 
relationships to 
evolve and continue 
after exit 
• What types of ongoing support 
would be most useful, e.g., advice, 
mentoring, technical assistance? 
1. Prevent slippage by re-entering 
if necessary 
It is clear that there is a paucity of directly related literature on the topic of this 
study. If one were to take the more literal definition of devolution, that is, pass-
ing management and responsibility to a lower level of government as in the 
United Kingdom’s devolution of programs to Scotland or Wales or a central 
government devolving service delivery to municipalities, one can find another 
body of literature about devolution. While much of this literature is not applica-
ble to the subject of devolution of IDRC secretariats, there are two lessons that 
can be drawn from this source.  
The first lesson is that successful devolution requires a recipient that has the 
social, economic, political and managerial capacity to carry out the devolved 
responsibilities. This is a reoccurring theme coming from discussions about de-
volution at IDRC. This chronic problem is aptly captured in the words of one 
interviewee who stated: 
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 Excerpted from Levinger and McCleod (2002), “Hello I must be going: Ensuring 
quality services and sustainable benefits through well designed exit strategies”. Educa-
tion Development Center. 
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“One of the major challenges is to find a suitable institution to devolve the initiative to. 
For example, the Climate Change Adaptation in Africa project is a very new area to 
Africa, therefore the problem has been to find a partner in the field. Finding institu-
tions with the required mix of technical and administrative competence is often difficult 
in developing countries. … Another challenge is finding institutions that have a re-
search to policy focus similar to IDRC’s. …. Another issue that needs to be taken 
into account is the stability of the host/partner. If the program or secretariat is devolved 
to one institution and that institution collapses one or two years later, the program is 
lost. The IDRC way of doing things is very difficult to transfer. Capacity building 
needs to start from the inception of the project.”   
The second and related lesson is that successful devolution is seriously ham-
pered if the devolving authority does not provide some level of essential sup-
port to the recipients. This is best illustrated by the case of major hand-downs 
such as Canada’s devolution of one of its largest activities, the multibillion dollar 
Labor Market Development Program29, when in 1997 and 1998 it passed these 
responsibilities on to provinces that in turn passed the responsibility along to 
over 300 communities, municipal governments and a variety of other organiza-
tions. In doing so, the government followed the devolution with the elimination 
of its central capacity to coordinate and maintain the program including its intel-
lectual capacity. Further, it overlooked the need for tools and skills required to 
effectively manage partnerships and new relationships. These oversights inhib-
ited the early success of the devolution.  A little forethought would have en-
sured that the knowledge and intellectual capital built up over the decades prior 
to the devolution would have been useful, if not invaluable to the newly config-
ured organizations in delivering this series of programs.30   
                                                 
29 The program included job creation, targeted wage subsidies, employment programs, 
training, employment assistance, labor market partnerships and much more. 
30 Armstrong J and D Lenihan. From Controlling to Collaborating: When Governments 
Want to be Partners. IPAC 1998.  ISBN 0-920715-83-4.  
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SECTION 4 
IDRC DEVOLUTION POLICIES AND PROCESSES 
4.1 IDRC’s Devolution Policies  
This section of the report will discuss IDRC’s definition of and rationale 
for devolution; the extent to which devolution is understood within 
IDRC; and the extent to which IDRC has developed clear policies to 
guide devolution. 
Finding 1: IDRC explicitly refers to ‘devolution’ in its CSPF 2000 to 2005 
and CSPF 2005 to 2010, but these references are not definitions per se. A 
proposed working definition of ‘good performance in devolution to the 
South’ was developed in 2002, however there is little evidence that it was 
incorporated into IDRC’s CAF or other relevant policy. 
A highly valued principle of IDRC is the need to facilitate ownership and build 
research capacity in Southern institutions. However, there appears to be some 
confusion about what this means in practice. Documented references, such as 
the CSPF 2000 to 2005, notes under IDRC’s Guiding Principles: 
“In strengthening the research capabilities, innovative skills and institutions of the de-
veloping regions, the Centre will concentrate on research capacity in terms of human re-
sources, and will strengthen institutions in support of program objectives and of build-
ing a sustainable research capacity. We will give priority to existing institutions to 
carry out their missions more effectively, rather than creating new ones. We will also 
seek opportunities to contribute to the creation of a more positive and encouraging cli-
mate for research in developing countries. Where feasible, the Centre will devolve the re-
sponsibility for coordination, administration and management of programs and net-
works to institutions in the South.” (p. 18) 
The ‘where feasible’ is somewhat ambiguous and does not suggest that it is an-
ticipated that all programs and networks will be devolved, but only under certain 
circumstances. However, the criteria for ‘devolution’ are never stated. A memo-
randum from Terry Smutylo, Director of Evaluation, to the Senior Management 
Committee (SMC) dated August 8th 2002, suggests a working definition of good 
performance in devolution to the South: 
“While recognizing that multiple factors can influence decisions related to the timing 
and mechanisms involved in planning for the process of devolution, the Centre actively 
pursues opportunities to devolve responsibilities for research coordination, management, 
administration, and technical oversight to recipient institutions.  As much as possible, 
the Centre encourages and facilitates devolution of projects, programs and networks to 
existing, Southern institutions.  Fostering an environment of shared responsibility and 
taking a learning approach to devolution, the Centre develops partnership and support 
strategies tailored to recipients’ evolving contexts, capacities and needs, and enhancing 
their intellectual and administrative capacities as necessary. The Centre also devotes 
time and resources to supporting these institutions in establishing more independent re-
lationships with external donors, other Canadian institutions, and indigenous sources 
“IDRC’s commitment to the princi-
ple of devolution/ ownership by 
Southern partners…was given as 
the primary reason for wanting to 
devolve in many of the examples 
discussed (ATPS, TIPS, SIS-
ERA, MIMAP LeaRN 
LA&Car.Network, WDMF, 
FORST, ADRF) and was usually 
presented as a given (that is, want-
ing to have developing countries [as] 
partners in charge was always in the 
plan).” 
Backgrounder for the Second SMC 
CAF Session on the Performance 
Area: Devolution to the South, 2002 
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of support making the process of devolution more sustainable. The Centre works with 
Southern organizations to plan for devolution, assessing constraints and possible risks, 
and to reach a realistic time frame for a process of substantive and sustainable devolu-
tion consistent with IDRC development research principles and priorities.  The Centre 
monitors devolution processes and outcomes, including the nature of post-devolution re-
lationships between the Centre and its partners.” 
This proposed definition was not adopted. The CSPF 2005-2010 paragraph 118 
returns to the more open reference of devolution ‘where appropriate’: 
“The Centre will continue to devolve activities where appropriate. Devolution involves 
the passing of substantive and managerial control of an activity housed within the Cen-
tre to an external agency. Historically, the Centre has housed activities within its struc-
ture and then devolved them for three reasons: 
 An activity may have been “incubated” at the Centre until an appropriate final 
locale, be it an existing institution or a newly created one, was found; 
 The Centre’s belief in capacity building, and in not “hanging on” to activities; and 
 A hitherto in-house activity will grow, programmatically and in size, to the point 
where it would be more appropriate to spin it off as an independent entity or to an-
other institution.” 
Although this latter reference makes mention of the historical reasons for de-
volving initiatives, it does not define criteria or approaches to devolution. A do-
cumented analysis of ‘devolution’ within IDRC is reflected in Maessen (2002) 
and “A Short History of “Devolution” and the CAF” (September 2005) that 
suggests that the definition of ‘devolution’ appears to have evolved over time. 
The 2004 and 2007 references mention key areas requiring assessment, in the 
event that a decision has been made to devolve the initiative, but there is no 
criteria guiding the decision to devolve, that is what specific milestones would 
trigger the decision to devolve. 
Finding 2: The concept of devolution is generally well understood, with 
some minor variations that seem to reflect stakeholders’ level of involve-
ment in the devolution process. Mixed views were expressed regarding 
the extent to which ‘devolution’ was a core principle guiding IDRC op-
erations. 
Respondents generally characterized ‘devolution’ as the movement of a secre-
tariat or program, previously managed within IDRC to a Southern institution. 
This could involve either the total or partial transfer of administrative, technical 
and intellectual management of an initiative to an existing entity or to a newly 
created agency.  
Respondents also noted that devolution within IDRC is most closely linked to 
changing the status of secretariats rather than programs, although programs 
have also been devolved. Several respondents stated that they had never per-
ceived ‘devolution’ as a core principle of IDRC but as a ‘tactic’ that could be 
implemented to ‘spin off, get rid of or transition’ a secretariat or program, based 
on the specific context.  This latter view seems to be consistent with IDRC 
practice. Devolution as a ‘core principle or practice’ might be evidenced by early 
planning or the development of comprehensive devolution strategies prior to 
the anticipated end dates of secretariats. In the cases reviewed, devolution op-
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tions and potential strategies were only identified subsequent to the decision to 
devolve the secretariat31.   
Table 3: Changing Definition of Devolution32 
Year Definition 
2001  The Devolution performance area is defined in the CAF as: “the devolution of responsibility 
for management and administration of research institutions in the South where and how we 
[IDRC] can do so effectively.” 
Three types of devolution were identified: 
1. Devolution to Canadian institutions and/or Southern organizations; 
2. Enabling recipients to do more in projects; and 
3. Devolving regional offices to Southern institutions through partnerships. 
2002 Management revises the categories for the purposes of Maessen’s 2002 study on developing a 
typology of devolution within IDRC: 
1. Devolution to existing Southern institutions 
2. Devolution to Canadian institutions 
3. Devolution to other Northern institutions and 
4. Creating a new institution in the South to devolve to. 
2002 In a meeting concerning the CAF in 2002, Michael Quinn Patton suggests that #2, devolving 
to Canadian institutions, is really more to do with “partnership” and does not really fit in with 
the typology in the same way; he suggests that it be removed and incorporated into one of the 
other areas.  He also suggests that devolution could be considered only in light of capacity-
building. 
2004 Devolution is defined within the capacity-building area through the following good perform-
ance characteristic: 
“IDRC supports a process whereby activities and/or functions can be, when and where appropriate, 
devolved to existing or newly-created entities in the South.  (footnote: This process would include an 
assessment of: the program’s potential for attracting continued donor support; the implications of 
devolution for the configuration of the programs operations; the institutional capacity of potential host 
institutions to absorb the program; and/or the need and feasibility of establishing a new institution 
to house the program”) In programs which have been devolved, IDRC continues to participate in the 
sustainability of the program as a donor ensuring that the assets and responsibilities of the program 
are legally transferred to the new host.” 
2007 The same definition as above is used in the ‘enhancing capacities’ performance area as revised 
by the EU in 2007. 
 
Finding 3: The overall rationale driving devolution of secretariats within 
IDRC appears to have evolved over time and can be linked to changes in 
IDRC leadership, economic situation and strategic direction in the late 
1990s.  
Although devolution has been explicitly included as a guiding principle inform-
ing IDRC’s operations since the 2000-2005 CAF, the movement to devolve se-
cretariats seemed to intensify after 1997.  Several reasons have been posited for 
this including: 
 A change in leadership at IDRC. It is acknowledged that the shift in 
emphasis away from secretariats as a service delivery modality coincided 
with the 1997 change in Presidency. A 1998 study by Armstrong and 
Whyte suggested that the drive to create international secretariats at 
IDRC as a new service delivery modality spanned the Presidency of 
Keith Bezanson, (1991-1997): 
“…secretariats shared their origin in his concept of an innovative knowledge or-
ganization (IDRC) and a flexible programming mechanism (the secretariats). 
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 Studies were commissioned for Bellanet and SISERA, however there was no evidence 
of ‘devolution’ studies on MI, INBAR, IMFNS or TIPS.   
32
 Excerpted from “A Short History of Devolution and the CAF” (2005). Author un-
known. 
34
  Armstrong, and Whyte, “Learning Partnerships: A Review of IDRC Secretariats” 
IDRC, November 1998. pg.19 
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They each owe their establishment to this vision and to his personal support. 
They also owe their emphasis on the best case scenario and their accountability 
framework to his leadership style and to the context of budget reduction, down-
sizing, and restructuring that prevailed in 1992-97, all of this against a back-
ground of concerns about the organizational survival of IDRC.”34 
 Improvement in the economic fortunes of IDRC. During the diffi-
cult economic times of the early to mid 1990s, IDRC was faced with 
several budget cuts and the need to generate revenue became a key 
driver of the organization’s strategic direction. The thinking at that time 
was that IDRC could ‘hatch’ research activities attractive to donors 
thereby facilitating access to the necessary funding and sharing of risk. 
The administrative fee charged for hosting these secretariats within 
IDRC usually formed part of or came from IDRC’s grant to the secre-
tariat. A substantially improved economic situation in the late 1990s led 
to a re-examination of the secretariat modality35.  
 As successful as the secretariats have been in terms of facilitating inno-
vation and donor collaboration, they have also been characterized as 
administrative ‘nightmares’. The administrative support services pro-
vided by IDRC, including human resources, legal advice, accounting, 
donor management and grant administration, had become burdensome, 
added to which the secretariats were no longer perceived to have added 
value to IDRC’s mandate or strategic direction.  
 At the same time, donor partners were expressing increasing uneasiness 
regarding the provision of funds to IDRC, some conveying the view 
that they were funding Canadian taxpayers rather than beneficiaries in 
developing countries. Donors began to express a preference for fund-
ing Southern based institutions rather than IDRC housed secretariats.  
 IDRC’s core function was research and many of the secretariats had 
become more operational in focus, including MI, Bellanet, IMFNS and 
INBAR. As such, they were no longer a ‘good fit’ with IDRC’s core 
mandate and in some cases it's program.  
 The 2005 to 2010 CSPF formalizes the ‘fusing’ of the secretariats with 
Corporate Projects and goes on to state that: 
“Partnership and resource expansion is inherent in all three modalities, which 
considerably diminishes one of the raison d’être of secretariats. Many of the 
devolutions of secretariats during CSPF 2000-2005 were driven by considera-
tions of (imperfect) program fit and (high) degree of maturity of the secretariat. 
Partnering can be achieved whatever the modality. It is assumed that during 
CS+PF 2005-2010 the financial imperative will not be pre-eminent in enter-
ing into an agreement. It is likely, then, that the secretariat modality as cur-
rently understood would give way to PIs and Corporate Projects without in any 
way diminishing the advantages of multi-partnering and joint programming.”  
Paragraph 117 
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 Paragraph 114 of the 2005 -2010 CSPF.  
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Interestingly, this later point was interpreted as a decision to phase out the se-
cretariat modality as reflected in the ICT4D-Bellanet Prospectus 2007-2011, pg. 
9.36 
Program initiatives had learned to act like secretariats rendering the need to cre-
ate them obsolete, a phenomenon also evident in the broader Canadian public 
sector’s experience with special operating agencies where a general consensus 
emerged that going through all the formalities to create special operating agen-
cies was a waste of time. What they learned was that they could exhibit the char-
acteristics of special operating agencies and derive the benefits without going 
through the associated bureaucratic hoops.  
Finding 4: The rationale for devolution of specific secretariats is often 
unclear and respondents agree that those decisions are ‘brokered at a very 
high level’. The decision to devolve was often based on ‘circumstances, 
changing program priorities and opportunity’ more often than on the core 
principle of Southern empowerment. 
One respondent noted that, “Devolution may not be the right word, semantically, for 
what IDRC does because sometimes, it is just about getting rid of a problematic program…”  
In the cases of Bellanet and SISERA the decision to devolve the Secretariat, 
seemed to reflect the confluence of changing program priorities and circum-
stances. By all accounts, the devolution process, in both cases involved compre-
hensive analysis of the available options. Table 4 below details the reasons given 
for the devolution of the secretariats included in this evaluation. 
In the case of Bellanet, several studies were commissioned including: 
 Bellanet: A Mid-Term Review, Michael Graham: November 1997 
 Bellanet  Evaluation Final Report, Review of Activities and Outcomes 
1997-2002, The Governance Network™: May 2003 
 Characterization of DGroups in Latin America, Bellanet LAC Final 
version, Rosa Cheng Lo & Margarita Salas May 2004   
 Future Directions for Bellanet, Whyte and Auger July 2005 
 Bellanet-ICT4D: Prospectus 2007-2011 
 IDRC: Project Approval Document: Bellanet Network Transitional 
Period, May 30 2008. 
The Senior Management Committee agreed with the Whyte and Auger (2005) 
recommendation for involution of Bellanet and the Director, ICT4D was in-
structed to implement that option. However, efforts to ‘involute’ were increas-
ingly frustrating, “…it was like grafting incompatible tissue”. The decision to devolve 
Bellanet was subsequently made. The rationale given was that ‘involution’ was 
not the most appropriate option for Bellanet:  
“…more effort should have been put into assessing that recommendation….Bellanet 
was not a good candidate for involution… Involution assumes a high degree of com-
plementarity with IDRC program initiatives… Bellanet did not have the potential to 
become a conventional IDRC program…. It was fairly autonomous in its operations, 
self sustaining, often bringing in more funds from sale of services than the ICT4D pro-
gram allocation…it was in fact a viable business proposition. Given the level of self 
sufficiency (particularly in funding) the decision should have been to ‘devolve’ Bellanet.”  
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 Several respondents also expressed confusion about this evaluation of devolution, 
given IDRC’s decision to phase out Secretariats. 
“There can never be a perfect trans-
fer of knowledge – some institutional 
memory of a Secretariat is lost in 
devolution” 
Key Informant 
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AERC 1984 1987 
A joint decision by donors involved in the 
consortium. 
Core funding  
provided 
since 1988 
$2, 987, 98038 
MI 1992 200239 
Stated reasons included the fact that MI 
had outgrown IDRC and was more fo-
cused on implementation rather than re-













Bellanet was always more operational than 
research focused and was ‘never a good fit 
with IDRC’. The initial decision appeared 
to be to merge Bellanet with the ICT4D. 
Later the decision to devolve was made by 
the VP Programs and Partnerships and the 








The closure of the Regional Office for 
South Africa, accelerated the devolution of 




$2, 849, 982 
INBAR 1992 1997 
INBAR had progressed from pure research 
to application for development. Stake-
holders in the region had been asking for 
an independent agency since 1987. The 
interest of the Chinese Government in 
hosting the agency. 
Total Core 
funding until  
2004 
$3, 399,883 
SISERA 1997 Closed  
EU and Dutch donors no longer willing to 
fund an IDRC housed Secretariat and 
difficulties experienced finding a suitable 






Secretariat at IDRC for 10 years; moved 
from proof of concept phase to operational 
implementation; no longer a fit with IDRC 
mandate.  
$2, 628,600 
ATPS 1994 2001 
 Driven by Dutch Government’s need to 






This notwithstanding, the decision to devolve Bellanet appeared to come out of 
the blue for staff who were under the impression that Bellanet was well on the 
way to becoming a permanent part of IDRC’s programming. Several respon-
dents surmised that Bellanet was not a high priority for the SMC and was never 
a good fit with IDRC. This coupled with “…weak leadership unable to chart a strate-
gic direction for the normalization of Bellanet” led to the final decision to devolve the 
Secretariat.  
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 The rationale for the different amounts of funding or the extension of funding was 
not clear from the proposals in the IDRIS database.  
38
 This does not include IDRC’s support for a Research Innovation  Endowment Fund 
39
 The only definitive statement on the date of devolution was in the most recent MI 
Strategic Plan 2008-2013. This suggested that MI spent 10 years as an IDRC Secretariat 
before it was devolved. Other documentation including emails and board minutes sug-
gest dates for transfer of Oct. 1 2000 and incorporation May 2001; the date the transfer 
agreement was signed. 
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The idea to devolve SISERA arose from the concerns expressed by major co-
funders, the European Union and the Dutch Government, that SISERA as an 
IDRC hosted Secretariat did not reflect the “Africaness” that these donors 
wanted. Initially, the plan was to devolve SISERA to an African NGO that 
could sustain its mandate. Several studies were commissioned aimed at inform-
ing the future direction of SISERA including: SISERA: Study for the secre-
tariat’s Evolution into a Senegalese NGO, (Dakar: Groupe Constanin, August 
2002) and Framework and Implementation Plan for the Transformation of SIS-
ERA into a Sustainable and African-owned Institution (Stephen Yeo, 2005). 
In January 2002, IDRC commenced exploration of the option to devolve SIS-
ERA to the Institute for Development Economics and Planning (IDEP) a UN 
organization. Diéry Seck, SISERA's former executive director, had just become 
IDEP's director and that organization's objectives appeared complementary to 
SISERA’s. After two years, negotiations fell apart when both parties recognized 
that SISERA would not have been able to maintain its autonomy within IDEP. 
Further, staff of SISERA would not be automatically absorbed into IDEP but 
would have to participate in a competitive selection process for positions in 
IDEP and would lose seniority. In September 2005, Directors of SISERA’s 
Partner Institutes funded a business proposal for the establishment of a free 
standing successor (the Centre for Institutional Strengthening of Economic Re-
search in Africa - CISERA), however the initiative stalled when efforts to raise 
seed funding proved difficult. Finally, IDRC decided to wind down the Secre-
tariat, which ceased operations on March 31, 2006.  
Several respondents expressed confusion regarding IDRC’s decision to close 
SISERA after the considerable time and effort that had been expended. As one 
respondent observed, “…IDRC wound up reinventing SISERA two years later in the 
form of the Think Tank initiative”. Further, the lack of donor consensus on the 
strategy for devolution was identified as a contributing factor to the final deci-
sion on SISERA. One respondent noted that, “…communication between donors 
must be clear and ongoing. In the case of SISERA it appears that the USAID representative 
(on the Steering Committee) was completely unaware of the decision to close SISERA… On 
multi-donor programs, all donors need to be on the same page.”40 It must be observed that 
there was not secure funding at the time of SISERA’s closure. The appearance 
of a new donor for a much larger but similar undertaking two years later could 
not have been foreseen41.  
The foregoing suggests that in both cases, specific circumstances gave rise to the 
decision to devolve the Secretariat, rather than the ‘fixed time period’ over 
which secretariats were expected to complete their work. Available documenta-
tion does not indicate any ‘deliberate’ planning for devolution prior to the deci-
sion to devolve the initiative.  
                                                 
40 The respondent acknowledged that the decision may have been communicated at a 
higher level. 
41
 This also seems to indicate that IDRC does not need to ‘devolve’ or find a home for 
every idea it incubates. In some instances, proving the concept might be as far as IDRC 
needs to go, after which other interested parties  might choose to invest or not. IDRC 
has fulfilled its mandate of successfully incubating an innovative idea. 
“Donors need to be united on the 
devolution strategy. In the case of 
ATPS, the Board did what the 
Dutch Government wanted. 
…Regarding SISERA, there did 
not seem to be any harmony between 
USAID and IDRC. On multi-
donor programs, all donors need to 
be on the same page.” 
Key Informant 
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4.2  Effectiveness of the Devolution Process 
This review of IDRC experience with devolution has been constrained by the 
fact that performance measures related to efficiency, effectiveness, relevance 
and sustainability of devolution have not been developed. As such, this section 
of the report will examine the extent to which past approaches to devolution 
have been efficiently and effectively implemented taking into account some of 
the key guiding principles underpinning exit strategy identified in the literature42 
and respondents assessments regarding ‘successful’ devolution.   
Finding 5: Even though programs and secretariats have been devolved 
since the 1970s43, IDRC has not developed any formal policies or guide-
lines to inform the development of devolution strategies, the manage-
ment of devolution processes or the sustainability of devolved programs 
or secretariats. 
As noted earlier, IDRC has produced a Management Policy Manual that in-
cludes a detailed breakdown of key tasks related to the creation and manage-
ment of secretariats and Externally Funded Programs. This document also notes 
that all proposals must include, among other things: 
1. The anticipated risks;  
2. The expected life-cycle during which the secretariat will achieve its 
goals;  
3. IDRC’s contribution to the secretariat and its program of work;  
4. The anticipated benefits and to whom they will accrue; and  
5. The anticipated outcomes and the method that will be used to measure 
and evaluate program achievements.  
Section 4.6.2 of the manual also refers to the “expected duration of the secre-
tariat”. Although the manual includes a section on project management consid-
erations for secretariats and externally funded programs, it does not refer to the 
concept of ‘devolution’ as an anticipated option for secretariats or externally 
funded programs and does not include any details relevant to the sustainability 
of benefits or termination of secretariats.   
Respondents were not aware of any formal guidelines detailing IDRC’s process 
for devolution. One respondent noted that every time that IDRC “…does devolu-
tion…it feels as if we are reinventing the wheel”. Although most respondents suggested 
that a formal document detailing key operational elements or guiding principles 
for devolution would be helpful, it was also noted that devolution as practiced 
by IDRC has tended to be very context specific and therefore a ‘recipe’ for 
devolution may not be possible. 
For example, MI was devolved as a Canadian non-profit corporation, IMFNS 
was devolved to a federal department of the Canadian Government, AERC was 
incorporated as a US non-profit corporation, INBAR was devolved as an inter-
national intergovernmental organization, and TIPS as a South African non-
profit. Despite a great deal of effort and time invested (an estimated two years) a 
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 These would include early planning, results focus, transparency, sustainability, flexibil-
ity, evidence based, learning focused and partnership approach. 
43
 The International Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF) was legally estab-
lished in 1978 based on an IDRC study by John Bene. www.worldagroforestrycentre.org 
 
“Part of AERC’s success can be at-
tributed to the fact that the Board 
…took the time to lay strong organ-
izational foundations for the new en-
tity. These foundations were grounded 
in clear assumptions of institutional 
autonomy, research independence, Afri-
can ownership and a clear division of 
governance and labour…the Board 
took responsibility for fund raising, key 
appointments, and financial and policy 
oversight, and the Secretariat carried 
out the program. The Advisory Com-
mittee continued the work of the old 
steering committee while assuming 
explicit responsibility for deciding on 
the research program.” 
Caroline Pestieau 
AERC History, 2008  
“Effective devolution requires a genuine 
commitment to doing devolution by 
both the Secretariat staff and the re-
lated branches of IDRC. The whole 
organization has to be committed.” 
Key Informant 
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host organization could not be found for SISERA. In each case, the intensity of 
effort expended was different, ranging from the relative ease of simply changing 
the legal status of MI to the complexity of negotiating intergovernmental ar-
rangements for the establishment of an international agency such as INBAR. 
It is certainly significant that deliberative planning for devolution was consid-
ered by the Evaluation Unit in 2002, including how different levels of staff 
could contribute to good performance in devolution (see Table 5); however, it is 
unclear as to why these were not institutionalized.  
Notwithstanding the contention that a ‘recipe’ for devolution may not be possi-
ble, incorporation of the suggestions in Table 5 would most definitely contrib-
ute to implementation of a comprehensive devolution strategy that is context 
specific and ensures that the necessary capacity and systems are built throughout 
the life of the secretariat. In particular, staff at all levels would  be guided by 
‘IDRC’s  goals and processes for devolution…that take into account institu-
tional capacities, contexts and needs…as well as strategic aims’. As such, a pro-
active approach to ‘devolution’ that places the needs of IDRC’s ‘partners’ at the 
centre of the process would be institutionalized over time.  This approach 
would also be consistent with the principles underlying good practices in devo-
lution identified throughout the literature, including the focus on early planning, 
transparency, sustainability and a partnership approach.   
Finding 6: IDRC appears to have a somewhat mixed record regarding, 
‘how well the Centre does devolution’44. Consensus suggests that the 
most significant factors contributing to the efficacy of the process relate 
to the experience, skill and leadership capacity of individuals rather than 
a clearly articulated devolution strategy.  
Devolutions that have been regarded as ‘successes’ in terms of timeliness of the 
process, due attention to key components, management of donor relations and 
ongoing communication with key stakeholders include AERC and TIPS. In 
both cases, excellent leadership was cited as the key ‘success’ factor. Signifi-
cantly, both of these involved the creation of new non-profit corporations based 
in developing countries. Ironically the creation of new entities has also been 
identified as the most difficult process among the available devolution options45. 
MI’s devolution was also a straight forward process, particularly as it only in-
volved a change in legal status within Canada; the transfer of existing assets and 
staff; and maintenance of the same location. The next most successful would be 
IMFNS followed by INBAR. In both these cases, special circumstances delayed 
the process since devolution from a Crown Corporation to a government de-
partment had not been pursued before IMFNS. Creation of an Intergovernmen-
tal ‘UN’ style entity was also a new and very complex process coupled with the 
fact that the Chinese Government had agreed to host the organization; there-
fore all negotiations had to be sensitively managed.  
                                                 
44
 The criteria for successful or less successful ‘devolution processes’ were gleaned from 
respondents’ qualitative assessments including the timeliness of the process,  clarity of 
decision making, internal and external communication and overall management. This 
review was constrained by the absence of any criteria related to ‘successful devolution’ 
defined by IDRC.  
45
 See IMFNS Board of Directors Meeting Minutes dated Tuesday 24th January, 2006, 
pg. 6 paragraph 7. 
“In the case of Secretariats that were 
not devolved [closed], the major 
challenge was finding the appropri-
ate host. In the case of SISERA, 
the organization did not have the 
research or funding capacity to man-
age autonomously. Although nego-
tiations with IDEP (UN) were 
started, eventually it was too com-
plex and extensive and there were 
no other options.” 
Key Informant 
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Table 5: Contributions to Good Performance in Devolution46 




 Clearly define the Centre’s goals and processes for devolution, indicating the 
appropriate  portfolio mix of different degrees of devolution that take into 
account institutional capacities, contexts, and needs, as well as IDRC’s stra-
tegic aims, and recognizing the need for a balance between corporate stan-
dardization and regional variation;   
 Make and implement the necessary decisions, policies, incentives and re-
source allocations to support and manage devolution-related activities. 
Regional Direc-
tors will: 
 Develop regional office strategies and capabilities for supporting and moni-
toring  devolution in their regions; 
 Participate with HQ and regional program staff in identifying and assessing 
institutional candidates for the different levels of  devolution and institu-
tional support needed; 
Team Leaders / 
Program Staff 
will: 
 Support involvement of Southern recipients in increasingly responsible 
roles; 
 In cooperation with regional offices, identify organizations for capacity 
building or devolution; 
 Increase number of projects and amount of external funding administered 
from the South (RAP), with selective use of CAP (and reducing certain types 
of CAP); 
 Experiment with building relationships with recipients beyond funding 
single projects; 
 Develop skills in institutional assessment and capacity building; 
 Monitor institutional capacities and contexts in order to identify opportuni-





 Rely on POs’ wisdom for assessing and selecting institutions and projects 
for capacity building and  devolution; 






 Seek frequent Southern representation in consultants, evaluators, external 
reviewers of Program Initiatives, program staff, management, and in ap-




 Regional Controllers assist program staff with institutional assessments at 
the regional level; 
 Build administrative capacity among recipient organizations; 
 Experiment with building new kinds of  relationships; 
 Identify gaps in capacity falling between research and administration of 
projects. 
The TIPS devolution appears to have benefited from excellent leadership from 
the IDRC and the TIPS side, as well as a project management approach to the 
process. A key informant noted that within two months of the Board’s decision 
to close the ROSA office, a comprehensive task list was developed including 
completion dates for each task and assigned responsibilities. The committee 
responsible for the process were involved in all of the decommissioning tasks 
related to closure of ROSA including transfer of staff to TIPS, termination of 
ROSA staff, relocation of Ottawa hired staff, negotiation of compensation 
packages; Financial tasks including auditing ROSA accounts, physical assets, 
reviewing project accounts; winding up project administration and office ad-
ministration and the management of all relevant legal issues.  
At the same time, the organizational structure for TIPS had to be developed 
including determination of the staff complement, legal transfer of employment 
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 Excerpt: Memo from T. Smutylo dated August 8, 2002. “Background for 2nd SMC-
CAF Session on Devolution to the South” 
51
 See Armstrong and Whyte (1998) 
“On the devolution of TIPS: The video 
conferencing infrastructure from the 
Ford the Foundation was used to hold 
an open consultation involving staff of 
the ROSA and Ottawa offices to raise 
whatever issues were of concern to them. 
The Staff Association of the ROSA 
office was asked to facilitate the proc-
ess. This ensured that everyone under-
stood what was planned from the be-
ginning … There was a great deal of 
work on the HR issues. IDRC did 
quite a lot to support locally engaged 
staff including hiring a recruitment 
firm, negotiating good compensation 
packages etc. Regular weekly meetings 
were held with HR in Ottawa and the 
Staff Association at ROSA was up-
dated regularly… Communication 
with donors was handled from Ottawa, 
by the President. Government depart-
ments and embassies were also kept 
informed throughout the process.” 
Key Informant 
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contracts, development of job specifications, and recruitment of new staff. New 
policies were also developed for TIPS covering HR and Finance. An appraisal 
process was conducted to identify the most appropriate accounting package for 
TIPS and a charter of accounts was also developed. All files then had to be con-
verted from the old IDRC accounting system to the new system work that took 
six months to complete. A comprehensive budget was also developed including 
restructuring/start up costs and operational costs. The acquisition of office 
space, furniture and equipment were also finalized. 
The legal incorporation of TIPS under South African law was handled by a local 
law firm. This task was delayed due to the fact that the “TIPS” name was al-
ready being used by another organization. 
It is noteworthy that a great deal of attention was paid to the ‘people’ dimension 
during the process. Key stakeholders including, staff at ROSA, TIPS and 
Schoolnet were consulted from inception and throughout the process. One re-
spondent noted that: 
 “…perhaps because of the rainbow nature of the ROSA office…we had staff from 
Ottawa and South Africa, from a range of ethnic backgrounds at various levels (tech-
nical, administrative, clerical)… we were very sensitive to the human side of the proc-
ess…remember people were losing their jobs.”  
Regular weekly meetings were held with the HR division in Ottawa and the Staff 
Association at ROSA was updated regularly. IDRC provided a great deal of 
support to locally engaged staff including the contracting of a firm to facilitate 
recruitment for staff negatively impacted by the closure of ROSA. Embassies 
and ministries and departments were also kept informed throughout the process 
and donors were kept informed through the Office of the President in Ottawa. 
In efficiently devolved cases such as TIPS, the process from decision to devolve 
to date of effective devolution was approximately 11 months. It is important to 
note in this case that three processes were being undertaken simultaneously: the 
closure of ROSA and the devolutions of TIPS and Schoolnet. This experience 
of ‘devolution done right’ under imperfect conditions is evidence of the impor-
tance of good management, leadership and sensitivity to ‘people’ issues. 
Finding 7: In the cases where the process was less effective, poor man-
agement and indecisive leadership as well as weak or inconsistent com-
munication were cited as the primary contributing factors. 
Stakeholders observed that, “confusion… uncertainty… mismanagement… weak leader-
ship” characterized the devolution process in the cases of Bellanet and SISERA. 
In the case of Bellanet, interviews conducted as part of this evaluation revealed 
that former personnel were still quite bitter about the entire experience. In the 
case of SISERA, stakeholders generally expressed amazement and confusion 
about the final decision to close the Secretariat, particularly as a great deal of 
time and resources had been expended up to the time that the final decision was 
made. 
In the case of Bellanet, the thinking around options (involution vs. devolution) 
commenced as early as 1999, however the Ottawa Bellanet office was only 
closed in June 2008. The length of time that elapsed during the process, ‘flip 
flopping in the decision making process’, the ‘secrecy surrounding the process’, 
perceived ineptitude of supporting services and senior management during the 
process all contributed to the challenging process.  
“Decisions to devolve are inevitable. 
Under the secretariat modality, there 
was never the intention that these 
entities would be permanent fixture; 
either they would succeed or fail. If 
they failed, they would be closed. If 
they succeeded, IDRC had to decide 
whether the Secretariat could be 
incorporated as a permanent part of 
IDRC’s programming or whether a 
home could be found for it.” 
Key Informant 
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In the case of SISERA, respondents noted that a comprehensive planning proc-
ess that included an analysis of the IDEP option would have revealed ‘up front’ 
the issues that eventually led to the breakdown in negotiations between IDRC 
and the UN. “In retrospect it may have been easier to establish the Senegalese NGO and 
wait the two years for ‘international status’, but IDRC had not been willing to 
wait…subsequently, IDRC decided that the whole process was too complicated and decided to 
close SISERA completely.” Improved donor communication and collaboration 
could also have facilitated a positive outcome for SISERA. In the words of one 
respondent, “…the decision to devolve must be a mutually agreed on and well thought out. 
SISERA’s devolution and closure was driven by IDRC’s internal processes…little attention 
was paid to other donors’ interests.”51 Perhaps the most important lesson the SISERA 
experience has to offer is the importance of transparency and open communica-
tion. It is clear that key informants were not aware of efforts made to find a 
host and that communication among stakeholders (IDRC management staff, 
donors and partners) could have been more effectively managed. 
4.3 Post Devolution Sustainability and Organizational Learning 
This section of the report will review the situation of the secretariats in the pe-
riod since devolution, including the extent to which the devolved entities have 
grown in terms of capacity to generate excellent research, increase delivery of 
services to its specific constituents, attract and maintain donor funding and sus-
tain program benefits. 
Finding 8: In retrospect stakeholders agreed that the decision to devolve 
was necessary and in most cases inevitable, as several secretariats had 
‘outgrown’ IDRC in terms of reach and fundamental changes in man-
date. It was certainly anticipated that devolution of these secretariats 
would benefit both the secretariats and IDRC. However, the extent to 
which these benefits have been achieved post devolution is not always 
clear. 
The incubation of innovative ideas, utilizing the secretariat modality assumes 
that sooner or later, IDRC will be faced with at least three options:  
1. The idea has proven ‘successful’ and is sustainable but is better man-
aged elsewhere;  
2. The idea is closely aligned with IDRC’s programming and would be 
best placed within the Centre; or 
3. The idea is not sustainable and the secretariat should be closed.  
Stakeholder feedback indicates that devolution is a response to the first option 
as it would facilitate: 
 Greater ownership and buy in by Southern partners; 
 Increased autonomy in programming and management; 
 Introduction of less bureaucratic processes and procedures (at least in 
comparison to IDRC’s processes); 
 Expanded access to funding from other international donors; and 
 Reduced dependence on IDRC. 
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From IDRC’s perspective, the administrative and financial burden of hosting 
these secretariats would be alleviated, thus ‘freeing up’ resources for emerging 
areas of research. More significantly, successfully devolved agencies should re-
flect that IDRC had effectively built the capacity required to generate and sus-
tain innovative research linked to policy in developing countries. 
The most ‘successful’ devolved secretariats in this review have been AERC, MI, 
INBAR and IMFN based on the demonstrated growth in their respective pro-
grams (reflected in expanded geographic coverage, expanded donor funding, 
positive international profile/global brand). Only INBAR had experienced some 
difficulty in generating core funding, after IDRC’s allocation ceased in 2004. 
Core funding is currently provided by the Chinese Government and contribu-
tions from member states.  
The success of the Bellanet network cannot be assessed given that it has broken 
up certain functions, eliminated others, and is currently transitioning some ac-
tivities to other hosts. In a recent ‘think piece’, Basil Jones compared the pre 
and post devolution situation of TIPS and noted that changes in leadership and 
donor funding forced the organization to expand into other complementary, but 
non-core areas. “The restructuring forced TIPS to broaden its research themes from trade 
policy to include industrial policy, economic regulation and small and medium enterprise strat-
egy development. In addition TIPS built relationships with a range of national and sub-
national government departments to increase the contribution of contract income from commis-
sioned research.” These changes impacted the implementation capacity of TIPS as 
well as its image, “…TIPS is not a thought leader in its field. The research that TIPS 
undertakes is not held to be cutting edge and TIPS is not seen as an organization that gener-
ates new ideas or brings in new perspectives.”53 The financial situation is also precarious 
with IDRC and AusAID the only consistent donors. Despite ongoing negotia-
tions with the South African Government firm commitments to provide fund-
ing have yet to materialize.  
Finding 9: IDRC makes every effort to ensure that devolved initiatives 
have the resources to sustain program benefits through the provision of 
core or legacy funding. However the organization has not articulated any 
guidelines or performance indicators that would inform either the provi-
sion or termination of core funding. 
In each case covered in this review, IDRC agreed to provide legacy and or core 
funding as well as the required support services to ensure that the devolved se-
cretariats benefited from a good start. In addition, several programs that have 
been devolved in the past continue to benefit from core funding including 
AERC. This is completely consistent with IDRC’s Corporate Assessment 
Framework (CAF) in which the organization commits to support long term re-
lationships with its Southern partners and in the case of devolved secretariats, 
sustained involvement as a donor. However, given the anticipated reduced reli-
ance on IDRC and expanded access to other sources of donor funding as well 
as the requirement of all donor organizations to optimize the allocation of re-
sources, it is assumed that ‘core funding’ should cease at some point.  
Ideally, this might be linked to the attainment of key performance targets related 
to research and or policy analysis capacity developed, sustained generation of 
relevant, high quality ‘cutting edge’ research, effective demand for the agency’s 
                                                 
53
 “Strategic Review of TIPS”. David Kaplan and John Howell. December 2008 
“Success rarely comes easily, nor is it 
absolute. Any successful organiza-
tion continues to face challenges for 
as long as it remains dynamic.” 
Caroline Pestieau 
AERC History, 2008 
“AERC is remarkable in both the 
length of its history and in its success 
when compared with most other 
projects that started out in the 
1980s with similar aims. Three 
important elements contribute to its 
long-term sustainability: fund rais-
ing, performance monitoring and 
succession planning.” 
Caroline Pestieau 
AERC History, 2008 
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research services, capacity to attract and sustain funding contributions etc. Re-
spondents identified several attributes of a successfully devolved secretariat in-
cluding: 
 A sustainable organization with the capacity to grow; 
 Strong leadership from the executive level at IDRC;  
 Meaningful work is produced, “not necessarily meaningful in relation to 
IDRC’s initial mission, but meaningful in the context of the host organization and 
its environment”; 
 Independent and autonomous management; and 
 Continued involvement of IDRC “ensures credibility and sends the message 
that IDRC still believes in this.” 
If IDRC’s policy is to provide core funding into the foreseeable future, this is-
sue is a moot point. In fact, IDRC’s provision of core funding is highly appreci-
ated by devolved initiatives given that donors do not, as a rule, provide core 
funding. However, if IDRC needs to optimize its resources in fulfillment of its  
mandate, guidelines on the provision of core funding would be helpful. This 
could be based on the attainment of performance targets related to successful 
devolution, among other things. 
Finding 10: IDRC’s tradition of selecting former program officers to head 
devolved secretariats has presented some challenges to devolved organi-
zations. The need for a competitive selection process for executive direc-
tors has been suggested as a strategy to mitigate this shortcoming.  
Several respondents noted that executive directors need a range of skills includ-
ing leadership, team building and coordination skills, organizational manage-
ment, fund raising capability and the ability to negotiate with international do-
nors as well as technical knowledge of the organization’s area of focus. IDRC 
program officers often possess the technical capacity, knowledge and experience 
related to the secretariat; however they may not have the project management or 
interpersonal skills necessary to manage an organization. The following quote is 
instructive: 
“Better and more prudential management of secretariats and their devolution seems an 
important lesson from INBAR. Centre management should have been well aware of 
the management shortcomings of long-serving secretariat management and could have 
taken steps to recruit more appropriate leadership and management before devolution 
began. Centre management of these complex devolution processes cannot be effective 
from the President's office and should have been retained to a much greater extent in 
Programs Branch so as to limit Centre and Chinese exposure to the very real risks at-
tendant on such high level, high profile efforts. However, the Programs Branch lack of 
involvement in the initiative cannot be understood solely as a function of the direct in-
volvement of the President's office, but also by inference as a direct indicator of its lack 
of support for the initiative.”54 
The importance of excellent leadership and management skills to the success of 
a new entity has been identified in the cases of AERC and TIPS among others. 
As such, it has been suggested that a more systematic approach to the selection 
of Executive Directors should be implemented. 
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  INBAR Project Completion Report dated 15/3/2002 
“A successfully devolved initiative 
should be sustainable, have the 
capacity to grow, the organization 
should be stronger in its devolved 
state; leadership must ensure that it 
remains strong. There should also be 
an ongoing relationship with IDRC. 
This should not necessarily involve 
funding but could be a presence on 
the Board. This continued involve-
ment would show that IDRC still 
‘believed in the initiative’ and would 
lend credibility to it.” 
Key Informant 
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SECTION 5 
CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
This section presents the main lessons learned from IDRC’s experience with 
devolution of secretariats. Some of the lessons have been identified in prior as-
sessments55 and reflect recurring themes related to partnership, collaboration, 
transparency, planning and capacity building. The content of this section aims to 
inform the thinking and approach to devolution practice within IDRC in the 
future. It concludes with seven principles to guide successful devolution. 
5.1 Lessons Learned 
1. Conceptual clarity on ‘devolution’ is critical to effective operationaliza-
tion of the concept and nurturing the ‘mindset’ for devolution 
The meaning and practice of devolution needs to be clearly understood by all 
levels of staff, particularly as it is closely aligned with the principle of Southern 
empowerment through capacity building. Such a mindset will facilitate delibera-
tive planning and management of initiatives with the aim of devolution.   
2. The extent to which an initiative has potential to be devolved needs to 
be explored during the design phase 
In each of the secretariats reviewed, performance indicators related to scientific 
and managerial capacity developed, effective demand for the specific research 
‘services’ and the extent to which the research generated informed either policy 
decisions or development interventions could have been developed at the de-
sign stage. Examples of indicators include: annual number of requests for re-
search studies; number of research studies produced that meet the standard for 
peer reviewed journals; number of research studies published in regional or in-
ternational journals; number of locally engaged staff producing publishable re-
search studies; National policies created based on the secretariats research stud-
ies; development initiatives formulated based on research studies.  IDRC’s 
“Good practices for capacity development” document could be used to assess 
qualitatively whether these practices are occurring and whether capacity is being 
built as a result. Each of these is also consistent with IDRC’s mandate to facili-
tate Southern empowerment through capacity building. As such, their achieve-
ment should constitute priority outcomes. The review revealed that questions 
relevant to these areas are often asked during the decision making process for 
devolution. If these are issues that would inform such a decision, they should be 
discussed and agreed with donors and other potential partners at the design 
stage. This would facilitate a shared understanding, unified vision and approach 
to devolution.  
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 For example, Maessen (2002) and Corporate Assessment Framework Discussion 
Sessions on Devolution. 
“It isn’t the changes that do you in, 
it’s the transitions. Change is not 
the same as transition. Change is 
situational: the new site, the new 
boss, the new team roles, and the 
new policy. Transition is the psycho-
logical process people go through to 
come to terms with the new situa-
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3. Integration of a devolution strategy during the design phase will also 
facilitate the identification and implementation of enabling strategies to 
ensure the achievement of performance outcomes 
If the overarching outcome is capacity building in the South, potential partners 
need to be identified at the outset so that the necessary capacity can be built 
from inception. The need for specific technical capacity might, for example, 
require investments to produce Ph.D. graduates in the research area. Recogniz-
ing this will inform the length of time that donors may be involved as well as 
the level of involvement. Capacity in a ‘cutting edge’ field would therefore have 
been created from the ground up. As a result, phase over to an entity that has 
grown with the initiative may be possible, rather than the current situation in 
which finding a suitable host agency continues to challenge IDRC. In the case 
where the programme may not be sustainable or relevant, partner agencies 
would have gained the capacity to determine the extent to which modifications 
can or should be made and chart a course forward based on the needs of their 
context. 
4. The devolution process must be flexible and iterative, however it must 
not be open ended 
The concept of “incubation” of an innovative idea suggests that sooner or later 
a decision has to be made on the future of the ‘idea’. A plan for devolution 
might, among other things, articulate success criteria and ‘triggers’ that will sig-
nal the need for the initiative to be wrapped up, devolved or retained as a cor-
porate project or program initiative. At the same time, such a ‘plan’ is not set in 
stone and should be reviewed and modified based on changes in the national, 
regional or global environment and changes in donor and recipient organiza-
tions. 
5. A rigorous assessment of the ‘readiness’ of the secretariat or program 
for devolution should be conducted to inform SMC decisions on the ap-
propriate options 
Such an assessment would reference  the progress achieved on perform-
ance indicators related to the technical and managerial capacity built, 
quality of and demand for the research product as well as the potential to 
attract alternative sources of funding, availability of funding to support 
the ‘devolution process’, quality of governance, leadership and adminis-
trative support among other things. An assessment of the performance of 
the secretariat on these dimensions would in fact trigger the discussion 
on the readiness of the secretariat for devolution. At the same time, 
IDRC is well aware that not every “innovative idea” needs to be de-
volved. Once the idea has moved past the proof of concept stage, op-
tions include shelving the concept or promoting it to donors for whom it 
might prove a ‘better fit’. As illustrated in the following inset box, IDRC 
staff previously documented the need for ongoing planning and assess-
ment of secretariats for devolution.  
6. Multidisciplinary approach to planning and execution of devolution 
Devolution is most efficiently implemented when representatives from the rele-
vant units across IDRC are involved and are able to bring the knowledge and 
experience from their respective fields to bear on the process. For example, the 
We are monitoring the devo-
lution process to: 
• Try to make sure that the re-
sponsibility is done to our sat-
isfaction (that is, jointly estab-
lish clear objectives of what is 
expected and then evaluate). 
• Try to make sure that the 
devolution does not deviate 
from the main purpose (IDRC 
staff are accountable, that pro-
spectus objectives are met and 
that activities conform to the 
CS+PF). 
• Understand relationships, 
changing roles and needs to 
make adjustments.  
• Learn about the sustainability 
of partnerships/institutional 
arrangements. 
 We are prepared not to de-
volve if we are not ready 
In Odilia Maessen (2002), ‘A Brief 
Synthesis of IDRC Devolution 
Experience 
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inclusion of Finance, Legal, HR, IT, Programs Branch, Communications and 
staff on the ‘devolution Committee’ is critical to ensuring that each of the transi-
tion issues is addressed, taking varying perspectives into account. The ‘risk miti-
gation’ perspective of the legal department should therefore be balanced by the 
tenets of generally accepted personnel management practices, perspectives that 
human resource management professionals can bring to the table.   
    
7. This multidisciplinary approach needs conceptual clarity. IDRC’s 
mode of operation needs to better inform managerial practice throughout 
the organization 
It is the case that many, if not most, program initiatives and not only interna-
tional secretariats, have as their essence the necessity to collaborate, partner, 
share information, network, engage in communities of interest and in various ways 
build capacity. This important and evolving “way of doing things” is very much 
part of the IDRC organizational culture. While it is well and good that specific 
managerial disciplines such as audit, finance, legal and personnel management 
focus on their areas of expertise, the devolution process requires a broader per-
spective. Thinking of devolving or closing a secretariat as a “liquidation of as-
sets” alone, or termination of employment contracts alone, or getting rid of a 
financial risk alone is too narrow a view to take in these situations. The skill and 
Some Characteristics of Good Performance by IDRC in ‘Devolution to 
the South’ Suggested by Respondents  
If we are performing well then: 
• We are striving for a shared responsibility and learning approach to devolu-
tion (that is, where control is not an issue) through a continuing partnership 
between IDRC and the institutions involved in devolutions. 
• We are planning for the process of devolution which includes: 
o A very good analysis of whether you really need an institution on that 
specific topic or not - will it continue to live on its own for a long time 
or is it just that we want to get out?  
o A commitment to have a capacity building component with the devo-
lution plan (to give donors the confidence to invest and because oth-
erwise we will always be able to say there is no-one with the capacity to 
take this on), which includes devoting resources to work with partners 
during the start-up phase to set up offices, develop a plan of action and 
strategies to engage donors, etc.  
o Developing partnership strategies (with partners) which consider part-
ners’ evolving needs and roles for learning and building capacity; ar-
rangements which promote sustainability (e.g. explore arrangements 
anchored in civil society) and those which facilitate the transfer of re-
search into action.  
o Developing communication strategies (with partners) so that partners 
can receive feedback early in the process about i) evolving needs and 
roles for learning and building capacity; ii) about how to be part of the 
national/regional policy scene; and iii) mechanisms to promote sus-
tainability. 
o Devolving substantive and intellectual as well as administrative respon-
sibility. 
o The involvement of Programs Branch. 
o A realistic assessment of the time frame involved to devolve in a sub-
stantive and sustainable way. 
In Odilia Maessen (2002) ‘A Brief Synthesis of IDRC Devolution Experience 
“It is clear that devolution is a 
complex process rich in variation, 
tailored to the particular circum-
stances of the research issue, the key 
partners involved, the state and level 
of knowledge of the issue, and the 
context both internal and external 
to IDRC at various points in time 
relative to the life cycle of an initia-
tive.” 
Background for the Second SMC CAF 
Session on the Performance Area: 
Devolution to the South, 2002 
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collaboration of each of these managerial disciplines is in need during devolu-
tion. Often individuals from these areas work together in support of devolu-
tions. However, this application of expertise varies from case to case. In some 
instances such as TIPS, their involvement is very hands on and direct whereas in 
others, such as Bellanet, their role has been more indirect. Similarly, the role and 
involvement of executive leadership has varied from situation to situation. 
AERC, INBAR and MI, for example, had considerably more executive engage-
ment than did Bellanet. 
8. A change management strategy must be developed and implemented 
that treats the ‘people’ issues in a sensitive and systematic way 
Devolution ‘done well’ versus ‘badly’ appears to hinge on the extent to which 
the necessary attention is paid to managing the needs, concerns and expecta-
tions of staff, partners and donors. A clear lesson has been that it is fairly easy 
to plan and implement the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the devolution process, whether it 
involves the establishment of a new non-profit or intergovernmental organiza-
tion or transitioning to an existing organization or winding down/phasing out a 
secretariat or program. In each of these instances though, ‘people’ are involved 
at all levels; people who have invested their passion, time and effort over a fairly 
long period of time; people who have committed to the creation of something 
innovative and  who are being asked, in some cases, to be actively involved in 
the closure of that enterprise. A comprehensive change management strategy 
that prioritizes people issues and ongoing and clear communication, among 
other things, must be a key component of the devolution process.  
9. Ongoing monitoring and periodic evaluation should be incorporated 
into the program or secretariat 
This lesson is consistent with IDRC’s project management approach as it is ap-
plied to the management of corporate projects and program initiatives. Monitor-
ing that tracks progress (or the lack thereof) toward devolution ‘triggers’ will 
facilitate review and modification of the existing strategy. 
10. Periodic evaluation should be incorporated into the programs or de-
volved secretariats that are funded by IDRC 
With the exception of cases like INBAR and AERC where key IDRC officials 
continued to have direct involvement in a devolved initiative, key informants as 
a whole had very little information about what happens to initiatives after they 
were devolved.  It appears that there is more IDRC could be doing to periodi-
cally look at and document progress. For example, in cases where IDRC pro-
vides ongoing funding it would be relatively straight-forward, as a donor, to re-
quest targeted evaluations from time to time.  
11. Improved information and document management would assist IDRC 
knowledge retention and transfer 
During the data collection phase of this examination, both consultants and 
IDRC staff had considerable difficulty locating several key documents. For ex-
ample there seems to be no central repository for transfer agreements and in 
many cases these documents could not be located. Board minutes are not avail-
able electronically making tracking decisions and finding information about spe-
cific initiatives difficult and time consuming. Further, in the case of some de-
volved initiatives, all documentation was transferred to the new entity.  
“Intense and serious monitoring of the 
new initiative to which grant funds are 
being provided remains a challenge. 
This needs to be improved.” 
Key Informant 
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5.2 SEVEN PRINCIPLES FOR SUCCESSFUL DEVOLUTION 
Seven fundamental guiding principles for effective devolution can be gleaned 
from the foregoing report. They are:   
1. Plan Early. Early planning is a cornerstone of successful devolution. 
This does not mean lots of paper, time lines, check lists and assignment 
of responsibilities. What needs to be done early on is the development 
of a well thought out strategy that is solidly linked with IDRC’s man-
date, values and strategic direction. This strategy needs to be flexible, 
interactive and able to encompass changing conditions and new lessons.  
2. Build Capacity. In most cases, successful devolution and Southern 
empowerment will require considerable capacity building that will need 
to start long before the devolution occurs. 
3. Collaborate and Partner. Open and transparent communication with 
staff, donors, and partners has, in each examined case, been a factor in 
the successful devolutions. By its very definition, devolution entails col-
laboration and partnering.56 
4. Develop a Transition Strategy. Once a strategic direction is set and a 
notion of timing in place, a transition strategy or change management 
plan becomes invaluable. 
5. Assure Continuity. A plan for continued involvement and availability 
of required intellectual capital is essential as was demonstrated by most 
of IDRC's successful devolutions. 
6. Build Good Governance and Management Frameworks. Taking 
the time early on in the devolution process to ensure that governance 
issues are addressed and that management processes (such as recruit-
ment, financial management, program management, accountability, 
monitoring and evaluation) are developed, improved and in place. 
7. Demonstrate Return on Investment and Secure Funding. Above 
all the enterprise has to be strong enough conceptually and have dem-
onstrated a positive enough return on investment to attract sufficient 
donor funding to maintain the newly configured initiative.  
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 The Strategic Review of IDRC by Cabinet’s Treasury Board and the necessity of 
secrecy surrounding advice to Cabinet made this problematic in the case of Bellanet. 
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APPENDIX A 
EVALUATION OF DEVOLUTION AT IDRC: FINAL WORK-
PLAN AND APPROACH 
Note: the attached Workplan is the final result of a number of meetings with the Evalu-
ation Unit and principle users of the study. There were several drafts between the first 
rough project outline in the engagement contract and the final framing of the task at 
hand. JLA and AK 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT 
This document constitutes the work plan for “Evaluation of IDRC’s Devolution Ex-
perience”. It outlines the Governance Network’s™ most recent understanding of the 
goals of the evaluation, as well as our proposed approach, methodology, deliverables 
and timelines.  
This draft work plan was developed based on the following: 
 Discussions with and contract documents provided by the Evaluation Unit, 
IDRC 
 A review of the initial documentation provided by the International Develop-
ment Research Centre (IDRC); and 
 The interviews conducted by Dr. Jim Armstrong, Team Leader, with key in-
formants at IDRC on 27th February, 2009. 
1.2 KEY ISSUES EMERGING FROM THE PLANNING PHASE 
The principal client for this evaluation is IDRC and the primary users of the findings 
will be IDRC senior managers and programme staff involved in future devolution initia-
tives. Discussions with key informants suggested that the evaluation should assess: 
 What does the Centre mean by devolution and how has the Centre done it? 
 IDRC’s concept of successful devolution, that is, what would a successful 
devolution initiative ‘look like’; 
 IDRC’s experience with the devolution process including activities undertaken 
in the pre-devolution phase; 
 The  factors or variables informing IDRC’s decision to devolve certain initia-
tives vs. initiatives that are not selected; 
 The variables that inform IDRC’s approach to devolution, for example, crea-
tion of a new institution vs. devolution to an existing ‘host’; 
 The actual devolution process including organization development, capacity 
building, communication strategy; 
 Effectiveness of governance arrangements in the post-devolution period; 
 The extent to which the changing environment has affected or is expected to 
impact the devolution process; 
 The extent to which IDRC’s perspective on devolution has evolved over time; 
 The results of devolution for IDRC and the devolved program; and 
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 Significant lessons to be drawn from the devolution process over the period 
(2000 to 2008) and how these can be utilized to inform better ‘devolution’ 
practice. 
2.0 METHODOLOGY 
This section outlines our proposed approach to the assessment. It is comprised of three 
parts: an overview of the proposed framework, a summary of data sources and methods 
of data collection, and an overview of methods of analysis.  
2.1 FRAMEWORK 
On the basis of our discussions with IDRC, we have developed a preliminary evaluation 
framework that will guide data collection and analysis. The framework in Exhibit 6 
summarizes the proposed major evaluation foci, questions and sub-questions. This 
framework will be adapted, revised and focused as the assessment process proceeds. 
2.2 CRITERIA FOR SELECTING SECRETARIATS TO INCLUDE IN THE STUDY 
During the interviews with the Vice Presidents that following guide posts for selection 
criteria were identified: 
 Leave out obvious outliers – ones that are on the fringe such as FoodLinks, 
WETV, and Aquatox. 
 Look at a group that has: 
o Evolved for different reasons 
o Different continents 
o Different degrees of success 
o Donor make-up 
o Different longevity (time since devolution) 
 Using the above noted criteria, suggested secretariats to include in the study 
are: 
o Micronutrient Initiatives (MI) 
o Trade and Industrial Policy Secretariat (TIPS) 
o Secretariat for Industrial Support for Economic Research in Africa 
(SISERA) 
o International Model Forest Network Secretariat (IMFNS) 
o Bellanet 
o International Network for Bamboo and Rattan (INBAR) 
o African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) (take a light look at 
this one only) 
 Continuing to use the above noted criteria, suggested secretariats to exclude 
from study are: 
o African Technology Policy Studies (ATPS) because of current diffi-
culties with respect to relationships 
o Mining Policy Research Initiative (MPRI): an outlier with respect to 
IDRC’s mandate 
o Aquatox 
o WETV: never closely aligned with IDRC 
o Blue Planet: 
o Foodlinks: never really got off the ground….faltering  
o Strategy for International Fisheries Research (SIFR): failing…hardly 
robust enough  
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2.3 DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION METHODS 
2.3.1 PEOPLE 
During Dr. Armstrong’s interview with the two Vice Presidents, the following people 
were identified to be interviewed. Some assistance will be needed to round out the list 
and to facilitate the desired number of 30 targeted.   
The draft table below identifies the key respondents (individuals and groups) who will 
be sources of data for this evaluation. TGN will work with the Evaluation Unit during 
the coming days to round out the information in the table below. Suggested respondents 
are divided into four distinct categories as displayed in Exhibit 1: Data Source: People 
on the following page. 
It is anticipated that an estimated 30 interviews will be conducted, comprising an aver-
age of four (4) per initiative and six (6) general interviews. Given that many of the meet-
ings do not require the presence of both team members, meetings can be scheduled in 
parallel. The selection of participants for interviews will be based on criteria such as 
length of time involved in the initiative and specific role in the devolution process 
(planning, implementation, post devolution management). IDRC’s assistance will be 
sought for the identification of additional or different criteria with the aim at ensuring 
the validity of the participants’ selection as well as the validity of the evaluation. 
Given the time and budget constraints, it might be necessary to prioritize the interviews 
with some respondents listed above. In such a case, the prioritization will be determined 
in agreement with the Evaluation Unit. 
2.3.2 DOCUMENTS 
Appendix B presents the indicative list of documents to be reviewed for this evaluation. 
Other documents may be added to this list as appropriate based on further input from 
IDRC. 
2.3.3 FIELD MISSION 
The field mission will involve face-to-face interviews and phone interviews as necessary 
as well as additional document review. 
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Exhibit 1: Data Source: People 
ORGANIZATION RESPONDENTS/ CATEGORIES COLLECTION 
METHOD 
IDRC (Ottawa) 
 Former President IDRC 
Evaluation Unit Staff 
IDRC project managers re the 
seven selected initiatives  
Grants administration staff 
Finance 




Note: need to agree 





b) Trade and Industrial Pol-
icy Secretariat (TIPS) 
c) Secretariat for Institu-
tional Support for Eco-
nomic Research in Africa 
(SISERA) 
d) International Model For-
est Network Secretariat 
(IMFNS) 
e) Bellanet 
f) International Network 
for Bamboo and Rat-
tan(INBAR) 












Project Beneficiaries (?) 
Individual Interview 
(Phone and face to 
face) 
Other stakeholders 
a) Select list of 2 to 3 un-
successful ‘devolution’ 
initiatives 
b) Survey of 40-50 indi-








3.0 ANALYSIS AND REPORTING 
Analysis will incorporate varied approaches suited to the components of the assessment 
design, including: 
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 The recently retired General Council was interviewed. In addition, following the 
main set of interviews the current Secretary and General Council and her staff dis-
cussed general maters with respect to devolution with one of the authors. 
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3.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
In these methods, reliability will be ensured through data triangulation (using conver-
gence of multiple data sources), the use of standardized instruments and compliance 
with standard practices in evaluation. 
A preliminary outline for the final report is provided on the following page. 
Exhibit 2: Proposed Outline for Final Report  
SECTION SUB-SECTION 
Executive summary  
1. Introduction 1.1 Evaluation background and purpose 
1.2 Evaluation methodology  
1.3 Organization of the report 
2.Project Background 2.1 Devolution: A Brief review of the literature 
2.2 Devolution in IDRC: Experience to date 
2.3 Project objectives 
2.4  Project description 
3. Findings 3.1 Findings 
3.2 Analysis and Discussion 
4. Conclusions, Lessons Learned, 
and Devolution Principles 
 
Appendices – TBD 
It should be noted that the outline above is indicative and will be subject to change as 
the analysis evolves. 
4.0 EVALUATION MANAGEMENT 
4.1 EVALUATION TEAM ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Overall, the Evaluation Team will be responsible for the following: 
 Developing a workplan to carry out the evaluation, carrying out the 
evaluation, outlining preliminary findings, and submitting a final report;  
 Providing regular briefings to the EU on the progress being made in the 
evaluation; and 
 Notifying the EU in a timely fashion if difficulties or challenges arise that 
may affect the success of the assignment. 
The following exhibit introduces the Evaluation Team members and describes their 
individual roles and responsibilities: 
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Exhibit 3: Evaluation Team Members Roles and Responsibilities 
ROLE RESPONSIBILITIES 
Team Leader – 
Dr. Jim Arm-
strong 
• Overall responsibility and accountability for management and con-
duct of the assignment, including quality assurance and oversight for 
production of draft and final deliverables. 
• Clarifying parameters for the assignment and developing the work 
plan, including the determination of sites and numbers of partners to 
be met. Client liaison, debriefings with client and other stakeholders 
as required. 
• Responsible for day-to-day management of the assignment. Respon-
sible for input to creation of all deliverables and for carrying out data 
collection and analysis, report writing, and regular progress briefings 
to the client. 
Evaluation Con-
sultant – Alexa 
Khan 
• Clarifying parameters for the assignment and developing the work-
plan, including the determination of sites and numbers of partners to 
be met.  
• Responsible for input to creation of all deliverables and for carrying 
out data collection and analysis, report writing, and working closely 
with the team leader. 
4.2 IDRC’S ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
It is anticipated that input will be required from IDRC re the following occasions: 
 To review and provide prompt feedback on deliverables: work plan, data 
collection instruments, preliminary findings, draft report; 
 To help with data collection in terms of providing access to information 
systems, providing stakeholder contact details, setting meetings during the 
data collection in Ottawa, assisting in communications  and other support 
as required; 
 To assist the evaluation team in identifying key organizations and indi-
viduals for interview; 
 To assist with identifying contact numbers for interviewees and for assist-
ing in setting up “hard to arrange but critical” interviews; 
 To provide email addresses and other logistical information for on-line 
survey; 
 To recommend other individuals or sources of data that the EU feels the 
team may benefit from contacting; and 
 To ensure that IDRC staff involved in the projects are available for indi-
vidual interviews and debriefing sessions during the proposed mission 
dates. 
5.0 RISKS AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES 
Some challenges may interfere with the evaluation process. Exhibit 4 identifies the po-
tential risks and mitigation strategies that we have identified from interviews and our 
experience with similar organizations. 
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Exhibit 4: Risks and Mitigation Strategies 
POTENTIAL RISKS PROPOSED MITIGATION STRATEGIES  
Unavailability of individuals Request email and phone contact information to fa-
cilitate follow up either during or post mission. 
Slow or difficult communication 
processes with stakeholders 
Allow for sufficient time in communication by re-
questing information well in advance of deadlines. 
Request IDRC’s assistance to organize and contact 
respondents to be interviewed. 
Ability to collect unbiased and 
varied views and information. As is 
the case with many organizations, 
individuals heavily involved have a 
propensity to hold a favourable 
view. 
Speak with respondents from different organizations 
and affiliations in order to get varied views.  
6.0 KEY DELIVERABLES 
Exhibit 5 below presents the key deliverables for this assignment and their delivery 
dates.  
Exhibit 5: Deliverable Dates  
DELIVERABLE DATE 
Draft Workplan March 17th 2009 
Final Workplan March 25th 2009 
Interviews and desk research complete  April 25th 2009 
IDRC Findings Workshop May 20th 2009 
Draft Report May 29th 2009 
Draft Report Presentation and Discussion June 6th 2009 
Submission of Final Report TBD 
IDRC Information Seminar TBD 
Telephone, email, or Face to Face Progress Briefings with the Evalua-
tion Unit 
As required 
The above schedule is based on the assumption that timely58 feedback will be provided 
by IDRC on the draft work plan and draft report. The dates might be subject to revision 
as the evaluation process proceeds. 
                                                 
58
 The Evaluation Team expects to receive IDRC’s feedback on the Draft Work plan within one week from 
the date of its submission. As for the Draft Report, it is expected that IDRC will provide feedback within one 
week from the date of its submission.  
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Exhibit 6: Evaluation Framework: IDRC Experience with Devolution 






• How does IDRC define ‘devolution’? 
• Do IDRC staff (head quarters and in the field) and partner organizations 
have the same understanding of the concept?  
• If not, how is ‘devolution’ defined/understood by stakeholders within 
IDRC? And by partner organizations? 
• What does ‘successful’ devolution look like? 
• What does unsuccessful devolution look like?  
• What are the expected benefits to both IDRC and its partner institutions? 
• Are partner organizations as ‘committed’ to devolution as IDRC? If not, 
why? 
• Are there implicit or explicit policies and practices in IDRC related to de-
volution?  
• How were these developed? By whom? 
• Were external partners involved? 
• If explicit policies exist, are they standard or are they specific to different 
interventions?  
• Do they include the rationale for devolution?  
• Are they an integral part of the project management cycle(s)? If so, are 
there clear guidelines for making these policies operational?   
• What types of initiatives have IDRC devolved to date?  
• What types of organizations has IDRC devolved responsibilities to?  
• How does IDRC determine whether to devolve to an existing institution 
versus creating a new entity? 




Evaluation Unit Staff 
 
IDRC project managers re the seven selected initia-
tives  
 




Office of the Secretary and General Council 
 








Project Beneficiaries  
Document review 
Interviews (phone 










Programme Planning Stage 
• To what extent are the issues of exit and sustainability considered during 
the programme design stage?  
• Do IDRC and their partners have a shared understanding of objectives to 
be achieved through the partnership?  
• Do they have a shared understanding of how the project/programme 
components and benefits should be sustained when IDRC withdraws? 
• Have devolution strategies been developed during the planning stage, e.g.  
expected timeframes of the programme/ project/ activity?  
• Have these been explicitly stated and agreed upon by the relevant stake-
holders?  
Project documents including project proposals, 
progress reports and evaluations 
 
IDRC project managers re the seven selected initia-
tives  
 




Office of the Secretary and General Council 
Document Reviews 
Interviews 
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Evaluation Issues Illustrative Questions Potential Sources of Data 
Methodology for 
Data collection 
• Are they documented? 
• Have any criteria been established (e.g. performance indicators) for ex-
pected results/objectives /goals to be achieved?  
• Are these linked to the implicit or explicit transition point for the project/ 
programme?  
• If devolution strategies have not been formulated during the programme/ 
project planning stage or at entry point, what were the reasons for this? 
• Were there special features about the programme/ project/ activity that 
were not amenable to the development of a devolution strategy? If so, 
what features? 
During Programme Delivery 
• Was the initial expected timeframe for the programme/ project/ activity 
being followed? 
• If the timeframe was revised during the programme/ project/ activity de-
livery, what were the reasons for this (e.g. changing conditions etc.)?  
• Did these revisions have any implications for the devolution of the initia-
tive? 
• Were there any systems to monitor performance against any criteria for 
devolution/ transition? 
• How effectively did IDRC act on such performance-criteria relationships? 
(Also relevant at the point of transition.) 
At the Transition stage 
• How was the decision to devolve the initiative taken? 
•  What was the basis for the decision? Who was involved? 
• Was devolution the result of a previously established set of criteria in the 
program’s transition strategy? 
• How was the decision to devolve the initiative communicated?  
• What kind of dialogue with partners and beneficiaries was facilitated?  
• Who facilitated the dialogue and how? 
• What mechanisms were established to enable the transition including 
communication strategy, capacity building, resource mobilization, govern-
ance arrangements, wrapping up of field offices, closing of accounts, au-
dits, transfer of records etc.? 
 




















• What have been some of the consequences of the decision to devolve spe-
cific initiative 
• Can these be linked to the process of devolution? If not, what other fac-
IDRC project managers re the seven selected initia-
tives  
Grants administration staff 
Interviews 
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Evaluation Issues Illustrative Questions Potential Sources of Data 
Methodology for 
Data collection 
learning tors have contributed to the current status of these initiatives? 
• Have relevant activities continued (possibly modified) to serve the 
goals/objectives of the programme/ project/activity?  
• How have project/programme benefits been sustained? 
• What were the key factors affecting the sustainability of the pro-
gramme/project/activity?  
• Were there any provisions that could be taken to increase the likelihood 
that interventions will be sustainable in the long run? If so, what provi-
sions? 
• How does IDRC input feedback on experiences from previous devolved 
initiatives into the development of policy/principles? 
Finance 
Office of the Secretary and General Council 







• What is to be considered “good practice” within development assistance 
agencies with regard to devolution/transition strategies? How well does 
IDRC practice compare to such “good practices”? 
Review of relevant literature re donor ex-
it/transition strategies 
Representatives of at least four (4) other donor 





• When, and for what level of programming, is a devolution strategy rele-
vant, and why?  
• What should trigger devolution? 
• How can planning for devolution be more effectively integrated into 
IDRC’s programme and project management cycle? 
• How can IDRC secure credible commitment to an established devolution 
strategy and alter any perverse incentives that might be created by pro-
gramming for devolution (e.g. incentives to not achieve objectives since it 
will lead to the termination of support)? 
What have been key lessons learned in terms of: 
• Systems and procedures necessary to facilitate efficient project devolution; 
• IDRC’s capacity to manage each phase of its devolution strategy 
• Knowledge built and innovative approaches developed 
• What would be some of the key recommendations for IDRC’s overall ap-
proach to devolution in the future? 
IDRC project managers re the seven selected initia-
tives  
Grants administration staff 
Finance 
Office of the Secretary and General Council 










                                                 
59 Each of these organizations have completed some assessment of their experiences with exit/transition/phaseover/devolution. 
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APPENDIX B 
DOCUMENTS RECEIVED AS OF MAY 25TH 2009 
 
AERC (African Economic Re-
search Consortium) 
 Basil Jones, IDRC: Trip Re-
port, Ethiopia, October 30, 
2006 
 Brent Herbert-Copley, 
IDRC: Rolling Project 
Completion Report, August 
2, 2006 
 Basil Jones, IDRC: Trip Re-
port, Dakar, Senegal, March 
10, 2006 
 Brent Herbert-Copley, 
IDRC: Rolling Project 
Completion Report, De-
cember 20, 2006 
 Brent Herbert –Copley, 
IDRC: Trip Report, Nai-
robi/Arusha, November 5 – 
18, 2002 
 Caroline Pestieau, AERC: 
AERC History Chapter 1: 
Governance, Management 
and Structure – A Model 
That Works, 2008 
 Marc Wuyts (with assistance 
from Tausi Kida), Institute 
of Social Studies, The 
Hague, The Netherlands: 
An Evaluation of the AERC 
Research Programme: 1997 
– 2003, July, 2004 
 Olu Ajakaiye, Director of 
Research, AERC to Elias 
Ayuk, Acting Executive Di-
rector, Secretariat for Insti-
tutional Support for Eco-
nomic Research in Africa 
(SISERA): Request for Fi-
nancial Support for the Af-
rican Econometric Society 
Conference, Nairobi, July 6 
– 8, 2005, February 17, 2005 
 PAD, AERC Research In-
novation Endowment Fund, 
Ph II 
 Rohinton Medhora, IDRC: 
Trip Report NO. 3-01, Jo-
hannesburg, Nairobi and 
Cairo, September 6 – 21, 
2001 
 Randy Spence, IDRC: Trip 
Report No. 5-2001, The 
Hague, March 14 – 15, 2002 
 William Lyakurwa, African 
Economic Research Con-
sortium (AERC) to IDRC: 
Request for Contribution to 
the AERC Research Innova-
tion Endowment Fund 
African Technology Policy Studies 
Network Evaluation 
 Daniel Chudnovsky and 
Lydia Makhubu: Evaluation 
of the African Technology 
Policy Studies Network, 
August 1996Jean Woo, 
IDRC: Rolling Project 
Completion Report, De-
cember 31, 2004 
 Jean Woo, IDRC: Rolling 
Project Completion Report, 
August 22 2005 
 Jean Woo, IDRC: Rolling 
Project Completion Report, 
July 1, 2006  
 Jean Woo, IDRC: Rolling 
Project Completion Report, 
March 1, 2008 
  
ATPS (African Technology Policy 
Studies Network) 
 Amitav Rath, Rasigan Maha-
rajh, Kathryn Touré and 
Moses Mbangwana (with the 
assistance of Christopher 
Smart): An External Evalua-
tion: The African Technol-
ogy Policy Studies Network 
– Main Technical Report, 
August 2008 
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 Jorge da Silva, IDRC: Trip 
Report, May 28, 2001 
Bellanet 
 Anne Whyte and Robert 
Auger, Mestor Associates: 
Future Directions for Bel-
lanet, July 2005 
 Bellanet International Secre-
tariat to Senior Management 
Committee IDRC: Request 
for Appropriation of Funds, 
August 27, 2003 
 E-mail from Allison Hewlitt: 
timeline of key events from 
January 2007 to January 
2008 
 Fernando Perini & Angelica 
Valeria Ospina, IDRC: Pro-
ject Approval Document: 
Bellanet Network Transition 
Period, 2007 
 IDRC: Memorandum of 
Grand Conditions 
 IDRC: Project Approval 
Document: Bellanet Net-
work Transitional Period, 
May 30, 2008 
 IDRC: Application for an 
IDRC Research Grant, April 
28, 2008 
 Michael Clarke: Director of 
Information and Communi-
cation Technologies for De-
velopment: IDRC Staff 
Message – Bellanet will be 
devolved by July 5, 2008 
 Michael Clarke: Director of 
Information and Communi-
cation Technologies for De-
velopment: IDRC Staff 
Message – Bellanet will be 
devolved by June 20, 2008 
 Michael Graham: Bellanet: 
A Mid-Term Review, No-
vember 1997 
 Program and Partnership 
Branch, IDRC: Bellanet – 
ICT4D, Prospectus 2007 – 
2011, April 2007 
 Rosa Cheng Lo & Margarita 
Salas: (Fundacion Acceso), 
Characterization of Groups 
in Latin America, Bellanet 
LAC Final version, May 
2004   
 Súla Batsú and IDRC: Bel-
lanet Transfer Agreement, 
June 17, 2008 
 The Governance Net-
work™: Bellanet Evaluation 
Final Report, Review of Ac-
tivities and Outcomes 1997 
– 2002, May 2003 
Blue Planet 
 Christopher Smart, IDRC: 
Project Completion Report, 
August 27, 1999 
CCAA (The Climate Change Ad-
aptation in Africa Programme) 
 Stephen Yeo & Michael W. 
Bassey, prepared for IDRC, 
Interim Report: Devolution 
of The Climate Change Ad-
aptation in Africa Pro-
gramme: Experience to 
Date and Strategic Options, 
April 2009  
Center for Global Development 
 Satish Chand & Ruth 
Coffman, Center for Global 
Development: Working Pa-
per # 141: How Soon Can 
Donors Exit from Post-
Conflict States?, March 7,  
2008 
COLAD (Center for Organiza-
tional Learning and Development) 
 Beryl Levinger & Jean 
McLeod, Education Devel-
opment Center, Inc.: Hello, 
I Must Be Going: Ensuring 
Quality Services and Sus-
tainable Benefits through 
Well-Designed Exit Strate-
gies, October 2002 
C-SAFE Regional Learning 
Spaces Initiative 
 Alison Gardner, Kara 
Greenblott & Erika Joubert: 
What We Know About Exit 
Strategies: Practical Guid-
ance For Developing Exit 
Strategies in the Field, Sep-
tember 2005 
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Devolution: CAF (Corporate As-
sessment Framework), SMC (Sen-
ior Management Committee) 
 Evaluation Unit: Corporate 
Assessment Framework 
(CAF), February 01, 2007 
(revised document from 
“Managing Program Per-
formance” 22/03/06) 
 IDRC: A Short History of 
“Devolution” and the CAF, 
September 2005 
 IDRC: Program Framework   
 IDRC: Corporate Assess-
ment Framework – 2nd Ses-
sion on Devolution 
 IDRC: Background Material 
for the Second SMC CAF 
Session  
 The Performance 
Area: ‘Devolution 
to the South’ 
 Synthesis of some 
IDRC Experience 
with Devolution 




August 14, 2002 
 IDRC: Update on IDRC’s 
Strategic Approach to Re-
gional Presence, June 2002 
 Mark S. Winfield, Director, 
Environmental Governance, 
Pembina Institute for Ap-
propriate Development: The 
Devolution of Local Water 
Management: Lessons from 
Ontario and Canada, Policy 
Workshop on Local Water 
Management, Ottawa, 
March 18-19, 2002 
 Terry Smutylo, IDRC: Me-
morandum from to SMC – 
Background for the Second 
SMC CAF session on 
‘Devolution to the South, 
August 14, 2002 – August 8, 
2002 
 Terry Smutylo, IDRC: 
Memorandum to SMC – 
Defining a CSPF (Corporate 
Strategy and Program 
Framework) Performance 
Area: Regional Presence, Ju-
ly 5, 2001 
ENRM (Environment and Natural 
Resource Management) 
 Jean Lebel, IDRC: Report to 
the Board of Governors: 
Environment and Natural 
Resource Management 
(ENRM) Program Area, 
September 2005 
 Jean Lebel, IDRC: Report to 
the Board of Governors: 
Environment and Natural 
Resource Management Pro-
gram Area, June 2007 
Environmental Management Sec-
retariats 
 Dr. Michael Nelson: Evalua-
tion of the Environmental 
Management Secretariats 
1999 – 2000 Small Grant 
Research Program 
Foodlinks 
 William Edwardson, IDRC: 
Project Completion Report, 
October 23, 1999 
IDRC Secretariats 
 Board of Governors, IDRC: 
The Strategic Framework 
for Secretariats at IDRC, 
June 1999 
 Dr. Jim Armstrong and Dr. 
Anne Whyte: Learning Part-
nerships: a Review of IDRC 
Secretariats, Volume 1, No-
vember 19, 1998 
 Resource Policy Group, 
IDRC: Secretariats Housed 
at IDRC, Report of a Work-
ing Group, May 1998 
IMFNS (International Model For-
est Network Secretariat) 
 Board of Governors, IDRC: 
Minutes from March 22 – 
24, 1995 
 Board of Directors, IMFNS: 
Minutes from January 24, 
2006 
 Board of Directors, IMFNS: 
Minutes from December 
2005 
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 Board of Directors, IMFNS: 
Minutes from November 
2005 
 Board of Directors, IMFNS: 
Minutes from September 22, 
2005 
 E-mail, Update on IMFNS 
Transfer, February 9, 2007 
 E-mail and telephone, Denis 
Deby discussion with Peter 
Besseau, June 5, 2002 
 E-mail, Jean Lebel, IDRC: 
Board of Governors, 
IMFNS 5 year Strategy pro-
posal, March 21, 2007 
 E-mail, Peter Besseau to 
Jean Lebel: IMFNS PAD 
and revised strategy, January 
8, 2007 
 E-mail, Jean Lebel to Peter 
Besseau: IMFNS PAD and 
revised Strategy 
 E-mail, Peter Besseau to 
Jean Lebel: NRCan-CFS 
contact concerning financial 
mechanism, May 2007 
 E-mail, Peter Besseau to 
Jean Lebel: NRCan-CFS 
contact concerning financial 
mechanism, May 2007  
 E-mail, Bill Singleton to 
Jean Lebel: Update on 
IMFNS for SMC, October, 
2006 
 IDRC: Memorandum of 
Grant Conditions: Canadian 
Model Forest Network, De-
cember 19, 2007 – Decem-
ber 18, 2011 
 IMFNS Transition: Prop-
erty, legal, financial and 
other aspects 
 Jean Lebel, IDRC: Memo-
randum to Senior Manage-
ment Committee, IMFNS 
Migration to CFS, June 7, 
2006 
 Jim Armstrong, Fred 
Carden, Amanda Coe, Sarah 
Earl, – The Governance 
Network™, IDRC: Out-
comes Assessment, July 
2000 
 Jean Lebel, IDRC: Project 
Approval Document (PAD), 
Research Projects, October 
2007 
 Peter Besseau, IDRC: 
Goodbye from IMFNS, 27 
February 2007 
 Senior Management Com-
mittee: Minutes from the 
Meeting of June 14, 2006 
 Senior Management Com-
mittee: Minutes from the 
Meeting on October 4, 2006 
 Transfer Agreement, 
IDRC/CFS 
INBAR (International Network 
for Rattan and Bamboo Research) 
 Board of Governors, IDRC: 
Minutes from October 25 – 
27, 1995 
 Stephen McGurk, IDRC: 
Project Completion Report, 
April 16, 2002 
 Stephen McGurk, IDRC: 
Project Completion Report, 
April 30, 2004 
 IDRC: Memorandum of 
Grant Conditions, Novem-
ber 1, 1999 – April 30, 2000 
 Kamla Chowdhry and Klaas 
Kuiper, IDRC: Evaluation 
of the International Net-
work for Bamboo and Rat-
tan, January  2000 
 Message from Cherla B Sas-
try on INBAR and her his-
tory, Anniversary of 10th 
Anniversary 
 M.S. Swaminathan and 
D.M. Cuthbertson: Evalua-
tion Report of the Interna-
tional Network for Bamboo 
and Rattan, May 1996 
 Stephen McGurk & Oliver 
Puginier, IDRC: Project 
Approval Document: IN-
BAR 10th Anniversary 
Workshops Support, 2006 
IPAC (The Institute of Public 
Administration of Canada) 
 Jim Armstrong and Donald 
G. Lenihan, IPAC: From 
Controlling to Collaborat-
ing: When Governments 
want to be Partners, a Re-
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port on the Collaborative 
Partnerships Project, 1999 
MAPPA (Medicinal and Aromatic 
Plants Programme in Asia) 
 Grand Agreement from 
IDRC to International Cen-
tre for Integrated Mountain 
Development, October 4, 
2005 
  Jean Lebel, IDRC: MAPPA 
Devolution Program Re-
search Project Approval, 
September 28, 2005 
 Kathmandu, ICIMOD 
submitted to Jean Lebel, 
IDRC: International Centre 
for Integrated Mountain 
Development (ICIMOD) 
Business Plan (2005 – 2010) 
of Medicinal and Aromatic 
Plants Programme in Asia 
(MAPPA) 
 Letter, J. Gabriel Campbell 
to Roger Finan, ICIMOD: 
Enclosed is the Business 
Plan of the Medicinal and 
Aromatic Plants Programme 
in Asia (MAPPA), March 
22, 2005 
 Letter from Roger Finan, 
Regional Director IDRC, to 
Gabriel Campbell, Director 
General ICIMOD, regard-
ing IDRC’s decision to de-
volve MAPPA, January 17, 
2005 
 MAPPA Devolution Pro-
gram Project 103268 
 MAPPA Budget 
 Request for No-Cost Exten-
sion of MAPPA Devolution 
Project, IDRC Grant 
Agreement no: 103268-001 
MI (Micronutrient Initiative Secre-
tariat) 
 Addressing the Global Mi-
cronutrient Problem: A 
New Mission and Strategy 
for the Micronutrient Initia-
tive 
 Audit Services, IDRC: Five-
Year Rolling Audit Plan & 
Corporate Risk Profile April 
2001 – March 2006, March 
2001 
 Board of Governors, IDRC: 
Minutes of the Meeting, 
March 29 – 30, 2001 
 Board of Governors, IDRC: 
Minutes of the Meeting, 
June 26 – 27, 2003 
 Board of Governors, IDRC: 
Minutes from October 19 – 
20, 2000 
 Finance and Administrative 
Services Team, IDRC: Min-
utes of the Meeting, May 7, 
2003 
 Financial Risk Assessment 
Unit, CIDA: Financial Risk 
Assessment of the Micronu-
trient Initiative, 2002 
 GAD e-mail, November 8, 
2001 
 GAD e-mail, November 26, 
2001 
 GAD e-mail, November 27, 
2001 
 Maureen O’Neil to Board of 
Governors, IDRC: Memo-
randum, Micronutrient Ini-
tiative Transfer, March 20, 
2001 
 Micronutrient Initiative Se-
cretariat: IDRC Audit Ser-
vices Final Report, August 
31, 2000 
 Sylvain Duford and Stephen 
McGurk: Grant Administra-
tion Models, Draft, 2004 
 Terry Smutylo to SMC, 
IDRC: Memorandum, De-
fining a CSPF Performance 
Area: Regional Presence, Ju-
ly 5, 2001 
MPRI (Mining Policy Research 
Initiative) 
 Cristina Echavarria, IDRC: 
Trip Report, September 9 – 
18, 2004 
 Cristina Echavarria & 
Fracisco Lara, IDRC: Trip 
Report – Collaboration with 
CYTED XIII (Chima Event 
Mission), April 6 – 10, 2003 
 David Szablowski, IDRC: 
Mining Policy Research Ini-
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tiative External Review, 
November 2003 
 Frederico S. Burone, IDRC: 
Rolling Project Completion 
Report, September 2007 
 Lisa Burley, IDRC: Trip Re-
port, TOPIC, December 15 
– 19, 2003 
Other Documents 
 Bridges, William, Managing 
Transitions: Making the 
Most of Change, Addison-
Wesley Publishing Com-
pany, Massachusetts, 1991 
 Mintzberg, Henry, Mintz-
berg on Management:: In-
side Our Strange World of 
Organizations, The Free 
Press, New York, 1989 
SATRN (Southern Africa Trade 
Research Network) 
 Basil Jones, IDRC: Rolling 
Project Completion Report, 
September 16, 2004 
 Basil Jones, IDRC: Project 
Completion Report, April 
19, 2006 
SIDA (Swedish International De-
velopment Cooperation Agency) 
 Sida, Department for 
Evaluation and Internal Au-
dit: Exit Strategies – A Con-
cept Note for a Joint 
Evaluation, 2005 
SIDA, Netherlands’ Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Danida and 
Norad 
 Anneke Slob & Alf Morten 
Jerve, Sida, Netherlands’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Danida and Norad: Synthe-
sis Report: Managing Aid 
Exit and Transformation: 
Lessons from Botswana, 
Eritrea, India, Malawi and 
South Africa, May 2008 
SIDA, Norad, Netherland’s Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, Denmark’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 Lars Ekengren & Claes Lin-
dahl: Review of Donor 
Principles and Practices for 
Exit: a Preparatory Study for 
the Joint Evaluation of Exit 
Strategies, March 2006 
SIFR (Strategy for International 
Fisheries Research) 
 IDRC: Evaluation Report, 
November 1995 
SISERA (Secretariat for Institu-
tional Support for Economic Re-
search in Africa) 
 Annual DPA Report to the 
Board, October 2001 
 Alain Berranger, IDRC: Trip 
Report, September 15 – 30, 
2000 
 Bannock Consulting Ltd.: 
Evaluation of The Secre-
tariat for Institutional Sup-
port for Economic Research 
in Africa (Annual Report), 
June 2004 
 Board of Governors, IDRC: 
Minutes from the Meeting, 
June 26 and 27, 2003 
 Board of Governors, IDRC: 
Minutes from October 15, 
2003 
 Building Organizational Re-
search Capacity: SISERA, a 
Case Study 
 Claude Briand to Thiaba 
Camara Sy, IDRC: Contrat 
de consultation Liste de Vé-
rification, May 19, 2006 
 Claude Briand to Mohamed 
Ali Marouani, IDRC, Exi-
gence de declaration de re-
venues canadiens, Septem-
ber 16, 2005 
 Dr. T Nzioki Kibua, Execu-
tive Director to Dr. Elias 
Ayuk, Acting Executive Di-
rector, SISERA: Future of 
SISERA - PI’s Director’s 
Meeting, August 2005 
 Elias Ayuk, IDRC: Secre-
tariat Activity Approval 
Document SISERA 
 E-mail, Rohinton Medhora 
to Alain, Brent and Jorge: 
March 05, 2004 
 E-mail, Martine Lefebvre to 
Laura: February 20, 2007 
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 Etienne Matte: Senior Op-
erational Auditor to SIS-
ERA FILE, IDRC: Trip 
Report: Analysis of the po-
tential transfer of SISERA 
to IDEP, August 30, 2002 
 IDRC: Memorandum of 
Grant Conditions: African 
Institute for Economic De-
velopment and Planning 
 Jorge da Silva to Members 
of SMC and FAC, IDRC: 
Memorandum: Secretariat 
for Institutional Support for 
Economic Research (SIS-
ERA) Management Letter, 
January 10, 2001 
 Maureen O’Neil: Memoran-
dum to Board of Gover-
nors, May 28, 2003  
 Maureen O’Neil to Board of 
Governors, IDRC: Memo-
randum, Secretariat for In-
stitutional Support for Eco-
nomic Research in Africa 
(SISERA), May 28, 2003 
 Maureen O’Neil to Board of 
Governors, IDRC: memo-
randum, Secretariat for In-
stitutional Support for Eco-
nomic Research in Africa, 
(SISERA), September 15, 
2003 
 Meeting of the SISERA 
Partner Institutes to discuss 
the Future of SISERA, Mi-
nutes, September 10, 2005 
 Rapport d’activité de Mo-
hamed Ali Marouani pour la 
période du 03/10/2005 au 
31/10/2005 
 Rohinton Medhora: Direc-
tor to IDRC: Social and 
Economic Equity (SEE) 
Rohinton Medhora, IDRC: 
Trip Report: SEE Program 
and Partnership, January 6-
8, 2002 
 SAGA Annual Meeting Re-
port, January 24 – 25, 2006 
 SISERA Annual Report: 
2002-2003 
 SISERA: Work Program 
and Budget, April 1, 2005 – 
March 31, 2006, March 2005 
 SISERA Annual Report 
April 1, 2004 – March 31, 
2005, July 2005 
 Stephen Yeo: Framework 
and Implementation Plan 
for the Transformation of 
SISERA into a Sustainable 
and African-owned Institu-
tion, September 10, 2005 
 Thiaba Camara SY: SIS-
ERA: Study for the Secre-
tariat’s: Evolution into a Se-
negalese NGO, October 
2002 
SNSA (Schoolnet South Africa) 
 Marc van Amerigen, Re-
gional Director, Regional 
Office for Southern Africa: 
Schoolnet South Africa: A 
Report to IDRC’s Board of 
Governors, June 2000 
 Program Framework : 
Schoolnet Africa ‘learning 
through school networking’ 
draft business plan, May 
2000 
 Richard Fuchs and Heloise 
Emdon, IDRC: Project 
Completion Report, Octo-
ber 13 2004 
TIPS (Trade and Industrial Policy 
Secretariat) 
 Basil Jones, IDRC: Rolling 
Project Completion Report, 
July 17, 2008 
 Basil Jones, IDRC: Project 
Completion Report, Octo-
ber 6, 2004 
 Constance J. Freeman, 
IDRC: Trip Report, South 
Africa, August 10 – 19, 2005 
 David Kaplan & John How-
ell: Strategic Review of 
TIPS, December 15, 2008 
 Denis Deby interview with 
Brent H-C.: TIPS Devolu-
tion, 2002 
 Grant Administration Divi-
sion (GAD): Extended 
Management Meeting Pro-
ceedings, 2001 
 Jeffrey C Fine and Professor 
J. Dirck Stryker: Trade and 
Industrial Policy Secretariat 
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(TIPS) of the International 
Development Research 
Centre of Canada (IDRC): 
Report of an External Eval-
uation, March 31, 2001 
 Rohinton Medhora, IDRC: 
Trip Report London, Ox-
ford, December 10 – 18, 
2000 
 Rohinton Medhora, IDRC: 
Trip Report NO. 3-01, Jo-
hannesburg, Nairobi and 
Cairo, September 6 – 21, 
2001 
 Stories: The Importance of 
IDRC’s Regional Presence 
 Importance of 
Esaro Regional 
Presence as exem-
plified by use of 
the RAF 
 Middle East and 
North Africa 
Story: The Water 
Demand Manage-
ment Forum 
 Regional Presence 
– Lacro 
 Two Examples of 
How IDRC’s Re-
gional Presence 


























 Two Stories about 
Regional Presence 



















 A Decade of Cele-
bration 
 Two examples 
from Rich Fuchs 
 Example from Ro-
bert Robertson 




 Stephen J. 
McGurk: An 
ASRO Story: The 
Asian Develop-
ment Research Fo-
rum, January 22, 
2002 
 Susan Joekes, IDRC: Project 
Approval & Appraisal 
Documents: Trade and In-
dustrial Policy Strategies – 
Core, 2001 
UNESCO (United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization) 
 Nick Davis & Meenakshi 
Sankar, Mark Jenkins & As-
sociates for UNESCO In-
ternal Oversight Service 
Evaluation Section: A Prac-
tice Review of UNESCO’s 
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Exit and Transition Strate-
gies, October 2006 
USAID (U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development) Center for 
Development Information and 
Evaluation 
 Frank D. Martin, John 
Eriksson, Stephanie 
McNulty (with the assis-
tance of Steve Metzger), 
USAID Center for Devel-
opment Information and 
Evaluation: USAID Evalua-
tion Special Study No. 81: 
USAID Graduation: Recent 
Experience and Outstanding 
Issues, May 1999 
 Michael Hopps, Conwal In-
corporated: USAID Evalua-
tion Highlights No. 65: 
USAID Graduation: Sharp-
ening the Policy on When 
and How to End Assistance 
(summarizes the findings of 
USAID Graduation: Recent 
Experience and Outstanding 
Issues, by Frank D. Martin, 
John Eriksson, and Stepha-
nie McNulty, Center for 
Development Information 
and Evaluation: USAID 
Evaluation Special Study 
No. 81) 
WETV (The Global Access Tele-
vision Network) 
 Board of Governors, IDRC: 
Minutes from March 19 – 
21, 1996 
 WETV preview – Report 
and Survey: Voices & Vi-
sions, Report of the WETV 
Preview, Broadcaster Sur-
vey, Beijing, China, Septem-
ber 1995 
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APPENDIX C 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS 






Years at IDRC Head Quarters: 
Years at IDRC Secretariat: 
Understanding the Concept of ‘De-
volution’ 
• Are you familiar with devolution 
as it is used within IDRC? Yes ⁭     
No⁭  
• If yes, describe your understand-
ing of devolution?  
• What does IDRC expect to 
achieve by devolving programs? 
What are the expected benefits to 
IDRC?  
• What are the expected benefits to 
the host organization? 
• In your view - what have been the 
key factors that have influenced 
IDRC’s position on devolution?  
• How has the devolution concept 
been communicated/shared with-
in IDRC?  
• How and at what stage of a pro-
gramme has devolution been 
communicated to partner/host 
organizations? 
Effectiveness of existing ap-
proaches to Devolution 
• Have you been involved in the 
devolution of any program at 
IDRC? Yes ⁭     No⁭  
• If Yes, state the pro-
gram/programs: 
• How were you involved in the 
devolution of this initiative? What 
was your role? 
• What was the rationale for devolv-
ing the initiative? What criteria, if 
any were used to inform the deci-
sion?  
• What about programs where the 
decision was made not to devolve? 
What was the rationale for this? 
• At what stage of the program was 
the decision to devolve made? By 
whom? How was the partner or-
ganization involved in the deci-
sion? 
• Was a devolution strategy devel-
oped? Yes ⁭     No⁭ 
• If Yes, describe the components 
of the strategy including aspects60 
of the project to be devolved, the 
time frame for devolution, capac-
ity building, activities involved, 
benchmarks/goals to be achieved 
prior to devolution, criteria indi-
cating host organization’s ‘readi-
ness’ to manage the program, 
communication strategy etc. 
• If, No, describe the process im-
plemented to devolve the initia-
tive? 
• Was a performance monitoring 
system created to track progress 
toward devolution? 
• In your view, how effec-
tive/ineffective was the devolution 
process? Why? 
• Describe the key challenges ex-
perienced in the devolution of the 
initiative? 
• Describe the key enabling factors? 
• How can the devolution process 
be improved? What can IDRC do 
better? What about the 
host/partner organization? 
Post Devolution sustainability and 
organizational learning  
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 Administrative, technical and/or 
other responsibilities.  
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(Only to be answered for programs 
that have been successfully de-
volved) 
• In your view, what have been 
some of the key benefits of the 
decision to devolve this initiative? 
Describe benefits to IDRC and 
the host organization  
• Have there been any negative ef-
fects of the decision to devolve? If 
so, please describe. 
• What factors have contributed to 
either the positive or negative ef-
fects on the devolved initiative? 
• How have the benefits of the ini-
tiative been sustained since devo-
lution?  
• What factors have contributed to 
or hindered the project’s sustain-
ability? 
• How has IDRC been involved 
since devolving the initiative? 
• Has IDRC compiled any ‘lessons 
learned’ from this experience? 
• In your view, what does successful 
devolution look like? What would 
be some of the characteristics of a 
successfully devolved project? 
Future of Devolution in IDRC 
• Should all IDRC initiatives be 
devolved? If not, what considera-
tions should guide the decision to 
devolve management of a project 
to a host organization? 
• What considerations should guide 
the decision to devolve manage-
ment to a new entity? 
• Are there any factors in the inter-
national development context that 
may affect IDRC’s decision to 
pursue devolution? If yes, please 
describe. 
• How can planning for devolution 
be more effectively integrated into 
IDRC’s programme management 
cycle? 
• What have been some of the les-
sons learned in terms of  the ap-
proach, systems and processes 
necessary to facilitate efficient pro-
ject devolution; IDRC’s capacity 
to manage each phase of devolu-
tion  
• What would be some of the key 
recommendations for IDRC’s 
overall approach to devolution in 
the future? 






Key Duties:  
Relationship with IDRC 
• What is your organization’s inter-
est in and relationship with IDRC? 
• Have you been involved 
in/supported this pro-
gram/project? If so, how? 
• What have been key achievements 
of the IDRC/XXX partnership?  
• What have been challenges/less 
successful areas of collaboration?  
• What do you see as the key value 
added by the IDRC/XXX part-
nership? What, if anything, do you 
perceive as special about IDRC’s 
support/collaboration? (What can 
IDRC do that you or others can-
not do?) 
Understanding of Devolution  
• Are you familiar with devolution 
as it is used by IDRC? Yes ⁭     
No⁭  
• If yes, describe your understand-
ing of devolution?  
• In your view - what have been the 
key factors that have influenced 
IDRC’s position on devolution?  
• What have been key factors that 
have influenced your organiza-
tion’s position on devolution, if 
any? 
Effectiveness of Devolution Process 
• Were you involved in the devolu-
tion of your this initiative? What 
was your role? 
• What was the rationale for devolv-
ing the initiative? What criteria, if 
any were used to inform the deci-
sion?  
• At what stage of the program was 
the decision to devolve made? 
How was your organization in-
volved in the decision to devolve? 
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• Was a devolution strategy devel-
oped? Yes ⁭     No⁭ 
• If yes, was your organization in-
volved in developing the strategy? 
Describe the components of the 
strategy including aspects61 of the 
project to be devolved, the time 
frame for devolution, capacity 
building activities, bench-
marks/goals to be achieved prior 
to devolution, criteria indicating 
host organization’s ‘readiness’ to 
manage the program, communica-
tion strategy fund raising, etc. 
• If, No, describe the process im-
plemented to devolve the initia-
tive? 
• Was a performance monitoring 
system created to track progress 
toward devolution? 
• In your view, how effec-
tive/ineffective was the devolution 
process? Why? 
• Describe the key challenges ex-
perienced in the devolution of the 
initiative? 
• Describe the key enabling factors? 
• Overall, how would you assess 
IDRC’s approach to devolution? 
What are the strengths? What are 
the shortcomings? 
• How can the devolution process 
be improved? What can IDRC do 
better? What about the host or-
ganization? 
Post Devolution sustainability and 
organizational learning  
(Only to be answered for programs 
that have been successfully de-
volved) 
• In your view, what have been 
some of the key benefits of the 
decision to devolve this initiative?  
• Have there been any negative ef-
fects of the decision to devolve? If 
so, please describe. 
• What factors have contributed to 
either the positive or negative ef-
fects on the devolved initiative? 
• How have the project benefits 
been sustained since devolution?  
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 Administrative, technical and/or 
other responsibilities.  
• What factors have contributed to 
or hindered the sustainability of 
benefits? 
• How has IDRC been involved 
since devolving the initiative? 
• In your view, what does successful 
devolution look like? What would 
be some of the characteristics of a 
successfully devolved project? 
Future  
• In your view, what considerations 
should guide the decision to de-
volve management of a project to 
a host organization? 
• Are there any factors in the inter-
national development context that 
may affect IDRC’s decision to 
pursue devolution? If yes, please 
describe what these might be. 
• How can planning for devolution 
be more effectively integrated into 
IDRC’s programme management 
cycle? 
• What have been some of the les-
sons learned in terms of the ap-
proach, systems and processes 
necessary to facilitate efficient pro-
ject devolution? 
• What would be some of the key 
recommendations for IDRC’s 
overall approach to devolution in 
the future?  






Years at IDRC: 
Understanding the Concept of ‘De-
volution’ 
• Describe your understanding of 
devolution?  
• In your view - what have been the 
key factors that have influenced 
IDRC’s position on devolution?  
• How has the devolution concept 
been communicated/shared with-
in IDRC?  
Effectiveness of existing ap-
proaches to Devolution 
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• Have you been involved in the 
devolution of any program at 
IDRC? Yes ⁭     No⁭  
• How were you involved in the 
devolution of this initiative? What 
was your role? 
• What was the rationale for devolv-
ing the initiative? What criteria, if 
any were used to inform the deci-
sion?  
• Was a devolution strategy devel-
oped? Yes ⁭     No⁭ 
• If Yes, describe the components 
of the strategy including aspects62 
of the project to be devolved, the 
time frame for devolution, capac-
ity building, activities involved, 
benchmarks/goals to be achieved 
prior to devolution, criteria indi-
cating host organization’s ‘readi-
ness’ to manage the program, 
communication strategy etc. 
• If, No, describe the process im-
plemented to devolve the initia-
tive? 
• Was a performance monitoring 
system created to track progress 
toward devolution? 
• In your view, how effec-
tive/ineffective was the devolution 
process? Why? 
• How can the devolution process 
be improved? What can IDRC do 
better?  
Post Devolution sustainability and 
organizational learning  
(Only to be answered for programs 
that have been successfully de-
volved) 
• In your view, what have been 
some of the key benefits of the 
decision to devolve this initiative? 
Describe benefits to IDRC and 
the host organization  
• Have there been any negative ef-
fects of the decision to devolve? If 
so, please describe. 
• How have the benefits of the ini-
tiative been sustained since devo-
lution?  
• How has IDRC been involved 
since devolving the initiative? Is 
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 Administrative, technical and/or 
other responsibilities.  
funding provided? Is a representa-
tive on the Board? Are there any 
reporting requirements? 
• In your view, what does successful 
devolution look like? What would 
be some of the characteristics of a 
successfully devolved project? 
• Suggest the five (5) most critical 
performance criteria that should 
be used to assess IDRC’s per-
formance on ‘devolution? 
Future of Devolution in IDRC 
• What considerations should guide 
the decision to devolve manage-
ment to a new entity? 
• How can planning for devolution 
be more effectively integrated into 
IDRC’s programme management 
cycle? 
• What would be some of the key 
recommendations for IDRC’s 
overall approach to devolution in 
the future? 






Relationship with IDRC 
• What is your organization’s rela-
tionship with IDRC? 
• What have been key achievements 
of your partnership with IDRC?  
• What have been challenges/less 
successful areas of collaboration?  
• What do you see as the key value 
added by IDRC? What, if any-
thing, do you perceive as special 
about IDRC’s collaboration? 
(What can IDRC do that you or 
others cannot do?) 
Understanding of Devolution  
• Are you familiar with devolution 
as it is used by IDRC? Yes ⁭     
No⁭  
• If yes, describe your understand-
ing of devolution?  
• In your view - what have been the 
key factors that have influenced 
IDRC’s position on devolution?  
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• What would you consider to be 
‘good practice’ with regard to 
devolution or transition strategies? 
Effectiveness of Devolution Process 
• If you have been involved in the 
devolution of any IDRC Secretari-
ats, overall, how effective or inef-
fective was the devolution proc-
ess? Why? 
• Overall, how would you assess 
IDRC’s approach to devolution? 
What are the strengths? What are 
the shortcomings? 
• How can the devolution process 
be improved? What can IDRC do 
better?  
• Suggest the five (5) most critical 
performance criteria that should 
be used to assess IDRC’s per-
formance on ‘devolution? 






Number of Staff in Organization: 
Relationship with IDRC 
• What have been the key achieve-
ments of your partnership with 
IDRC?  
• What do you see as the key value 
added by the IDRC/XXX part-
nership? What, if anything, do you 
perceive as special about IDRC’s 
support/collaboration? (What can 
IDRC do that you or others can-
not do?) 
• What have been challenges/less 
successful areas of collaboration?  
Post Devolution sustainability and 
organizational learning  
(Only to be answered for programs 
that have been successfully de-
volved) 
• In your view, what have been 
some of the key benefits of the 
decision to devolve this initiative?  
• Have there been any negative ef-
fects of the decision to devolve? If 
so, please describe. 
• How have the project benefits 
been sustained since devolution?  
• What factors have contributed to 
or hindered the sustainability of 
benefits? 
• How has IDRC been involved 
since devolving the initiative? Is 
funding still provided? Does 
IDRC sit on the Board? 
Future  
• What would be some key rec-
ommendations for IDRC’s over-
all approach to devolution in the 
future?  
• Suggest the five (5) most critical 
performance criteria that should 
be used to assess IDRC’s per-
formance on ‘devolution? 
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APPENDIX D 
LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS INTERVIEWED, INDIVIDUALS 
PROVIDING WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS, PARTICIPANTS IN: 
THE FINDINGS WORKSHOP (MAY 20TH 2009); AND MEET-
ING TO REVIEW THE DRAFT REPORT (JUNE 5TH 2009)  
Rana Auditto 
Director 
Grants Administration Division, IDRC 
Elias Ayuk 
Senior Program Specialist  
IDRC’s Regional Office for West and Central 
Africa  
Michael Bassey  
Consultant 
Former: Programme Officer, Senegal, IDRC 
Peter Bessau  
Director, IMFNS 
Shaun Bona  
Regional Controller, Finance 




Michael Clarke  
Director of Information and Communication 
Technologies for Development (ICT4D) 
IDRC 
Sylvain Dufour  
Director  
Finance and Administration Division, IDRC 
Colleen Duggan 
Senior program specialist 
Evaluation Unit, IDRC 
Laurent Elder 
Program Manager 
Pan Asia (another ICT for Development 
Program) 
Jeffrey Fine  
Consultant  
PERWIT International 
Richard Fuchs  
Regional Director 





Ricardo Gomez  
Centre for Information and Society  
University of Washington 
Ximena Gonzalez-Nuňez  
Acting Executive Director, TIPS 
Sandra Guttman 
Associate General Counsel, IDRC 
Allison Hewlitt 
Formerly worked for Bellanet 
J. Coosje Hoogendoorn  
Director General, INBAR 
Trent Hoole 
Associate Counsel, IDRC 
Basil Jones  
Senior Program Specialist  
IDRC’s Regional Office for Eastern and 
Southern Africa, Bellanet 
Sarah Kerr  
Former Technical Officer and Agent Tech-
nique, Bellanet 
Lucie Lamoureux 
KM4 Dev. Coordinator 
Formerly worked for Bellanet  
Jean Lebel  
Director  
Environment and Natural  
Resource Management, IMFNS 
Wardie Leppan 
Senior Program Specialist 
Research for International Tobacco  
Formerly connected with MAPPA 
Stephen McGurk  
Director 





Lynn Mytelka  
Formerly on Advisory Board, SISERA 
Evaluation of IDRC’s Experience with the Devolution of International Secretariats 
67   
Lauchlan Munro 
Vice-President 
Corporate Strategy and Regional Management 
IDRC 
Annette Nicholson 
General Counsel, IDRC 
Tavinder Nijhawan 
Program Management Officer, Of-
fice of the Vice-President, IDRC 
Line Noreau 




Maureen O’Neil  
President and CEO 
The Canadian Health Services  
Research Foundation 
Former: President, IDRC 
Caroline Pestieau  
Chair, Board of Directors, AERC  
Former: Vice President, Programs, IDRC 
Michael Roberts  
Regional Director, North America  
Bellanet 
Robert Robertson  
Newly retired 
Senior Program Specialist 
Legal Counsel, IDRC 
Cherla Sastry  
Founding and First Director General, INBAR 
Gordon Smith  
Executive Director, Centre for Global Studies 
Former: Chairman of Governors, IDRC 
Steve Song  
The Shuttleworth Foundation 
Telecommunications Fellow 
Former: Senior Programme Officer, Bellanet 
International Secretariat 
Randy Spence  
Director  
Economic and Social Development Affiliates 
LIRNEasia 
Former: Senior Program Specialist, INBAR 
and Director, IDRC’s Regional Office for 
Southeast and East Asia 
Graham Todd 
Formerly worked for Bellanet 
Frank Tulus 
Senior Program Officer 
Telecentre, IDRC 
Tricia Wind 




Innovation, Technology and Society 
IDRC 
Stephen Yeo  
Chief Executive Officer 
Centre for Economic Policy Research  
CEPR, London  
Former: Consultant for the Evaluation of 
SISERA, 2004 
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APPENDIX E 
BIOGRAPHY OF EVALUATORS 
DR. JIM ARMSTRONG is the President of The Governance Network™ (TGN), a 
private consulting firm operating in Ottawa for the past fifteen years. Dr. Armstrong 
has lead major consulting projects with Presidents, Prime Ministers, Cabinets and Per-
manent Secretaries in the Philippines, Vietnam, Egypt, Trinidad and Tobago, Suriname, 
Belize, Guyana, and Jamaica.  
Dr. Armstrong has also worked with the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA), International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Caribbean Develop-
ment Bank, and the World Bank. He was the Executive Consultant for Canada’s Deputy 
Minister Task Force on Citizen-Centred Service Delivery. TGN provides a full range of 
international expertise to Canada’s National Defence Department and to the Canadian 
Forces College, Revenue Canada, Canadian Borders Services Agency and Health Canada 
and many other national institutions. 
Dr. Armstrong’s career spanned working in high-level executive positions in three levels 
of the Canadian government (Municipal, Provincial and Federal). During that time, Dr. 
Armstrong has been a Department Head in then Canada’s largest municipality and has 
been the Chief Personnel Officer and Chairman of the Public Service Commission in 
the Province of Saskatchewan.  Dr. Armstrong has also served as Vice Principal for the 
Canadian Centre for Management Development (CCMD). He was also Director Gen-
eral of Consulting and Audit Canada. He lead Canada’s successful bid to host the World 
University Games and was personally responsible in Edmonton and Saskatchewan for 
major Public Sector reform initiatives, which included major restructuring, downsizing, 
budget rationalization and service improvement. He has served on a joint Cabinet and 
Deputy Ministers Committee on service delivery and chaired an OECD Expert Panel 
on Organizational Reform. 
ALEXA KHAN is a former senior public servant who since leaving the public service 
has focused her consulting career on Public Sector Reform; Project Evaluation; Policy 
Analysis; Health Sector Reform; Developing Programme Monitoring Systems; Chil-
dren’s rights; Gender and Development; and Training Facilitation.  
As Programme Director for the National Health Insurance System Technical Secretariat 
(Ministry of Health, Trinidad & Tobago), Alexa coordinated the work of the NHIS 
Technical Secretariat towards the establishment of a National Health Insurance System 
for Trinidad and Tobago. During her tenure, she performed the research related to 
Health Financing in T&T and chaired the NHIS Committee of Stakeholders responsible 
for developing a proposal for the preferred system of NHIS for T&T.  
As Policy Coordinator for Results Based Management (Ministry of Public Administra-
tion, Trinidad), Alexa was responsible for facilitating the establishment of monitoring 
and evaluation systems for key social sector projects, building a culture of ‘results based 
management’ within the public sector, and facilitating collaboration among government 
agencies to ensure policy coherence. She and her team coordinated implementation of 
several critical initiatives including the Opinion Leaders Panel Survey, a citizen feedback 
mechanism, the Public Service Employee Survey 2004, establishment and facilitation of 
the Policy Networking Forum targeting policy makers across the public sector to facili-
tate integrated policy development, conceptualization and implementation of the Prime 
Minister’s Innovating for Service Excellence Award Scheme . 
